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      Bankruptcy is the process by which financially distressed firms, individuals, and 
occasionally governments resolve their debts.  The bankruptcy process for firms plays a 
central role in economics, because competition drives the most inefficient firms out of 
business, thereby raising the average efficiency level of those remaining.  Consumers 
benefit because the remaining firms produce goods and services at lower costs and sell 
them at lower prices.  The legal mechanism through which most financially distressed 
firms resolve their debts and exit the market is bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy is also the 
process by which individuals and married couples in financial distress resolve their debts, 
although financially distressed individuals--unlike firms--do not shut down or exit.  
Governments sometimes also use bankruptcy to resolve their debts.  Like individuals but 
unlike firms in financial distress, they do not shut down.   
      This chapter discusses the economics of bankruptcy law.  Since the literatures on 
corporate and personal bankruptcy have developed in isolation of each other, a goal of 
this chapter is to draw out parallels between them.   It is useful to start by defining terms.  
Corporate bankruptcy refers to the bankruptcy of large- and medium-sized businesses, 
which for convenience I assume to be organized as corporations.  Personal bankruptcy 
refers to the bankruptcies of individual households and small businesses.  Small business 
bankruptcy is treated as part of personal bankruptcy, since small businesses are owned by 
individuals or partners who are legally responsible for their businesses’ debts.  When 
their businesses fail, owners often file for bankruptcy so that their businesses’ debts will 
be discharged.  Even when small businesses are incorporated, owners often guarantee the 
debts of their businesses, so that personal bankruptcy law applies at least in part.   
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        Regardless of whether the debtor is a business or an individual, bankruptcy law 
provides a collective framework for simultaneously resolving all debts when debtors’ 
assets are less than their liabilities.  This includes both rules for determining how much of 
the debtor’s assets must be used to repay debt and rules for determining how those assets 
are divided among creditors.  Thus bankruptcy is concerned with both the size of the 
pie—the total amount paid to creditors--and how the pie is divided.      
       For corporations in financial distress, both the size of the pie and its division depend 
on whether the corporation liquidates versus reorganizes in bankruptcy and corporate 
bankruptcy law includes rules for deciding whether reorganization or liquidation will 
occur.   When corporations liquidate, the size of the pie is all of the firm’s assets.  The 
size of the pie reflects the doctrine of limited liability, which exempts corporate 
shareholders from liability for the corporation’s debts beyond loss of their shares.  The 
proceeds of liquidating the corporation’s assets are used to repay creditors.  The division 
of the pie follows the absolute priority rule (APR), which carries into bankruptcy the non-
bankruptcy rule that all creditors must be paid in full before equityholders receive 
anything.  The APR also determines the division of the pie among creditors and requires 
that higher-priority creditors be repaid in full before lower-ranking creditors receive 
anything.  Thus under the APR, each class of creditors either receives full payment of its 
claims or nothing at all (except that the lowest-ranking class of creditors to be repaid 
receives partial payment).  
     When corporations reorganize rather than liquidate in bankruptcy, the reorganized 
corporation retains most or all of its assets and continues to operate.  The funds to repay 
creditors then come from the reorganized firm’s future earnings rather than from sale of 
its assets.  The rules for dividing the pie in reorganization also differ from those in 
liquidation.  Instead of dividing the assets so that creditors receive either full payment or 
nothing, most creditors receive partial payment and pre-bankruptcy equityholders receive 
some of the reorganized firm’s new shares.   Bankruptcy law again provides a procedure 
for determining both the size and division of the pie, but the procedure involves a 
negotiation process rather than a formula.   
     For individuals in financial distress, bankruptcy also provides a framework for 
resolving all of the individual’s debts.  Again the procedure includes both rules for   3 
determining how much of the consumer’s assets must be used to repay debt (the size of 
the pie) and rules for dividing the assets among creditors (the division of the pie).  In 
determining the size of the pie, personal bankruptcy law plays a role analogous to that of 
limited liability for corporate shareholders, since it determines how much of their assets 
individual debtors must use to repay their debts.  Unlike corporations, individual debtors 
in bankruptcy are not required to use all of their assets to repay their debts.  Instead, 
personal bankruptcy specifies exemption levels, which are maximum amounts of both 
financial wealth and post-bankruptcy earnings that bankrupt individuals are allowed to 
keep.  Amounts in excess of the exemption levels must be used to repay debt.   To divide 
the pie, personal bankruptcy specifies a division rule.  As in corporate bankruptcy, the 
division rule may either be the APR or a rule under which all creditors receive partial 
payment.
2      
       An important difference between personal and corporate bankruptcy procedures is 
that true liquidation never occurs in personal bankruptcy (even though the Chapter 7 
personal bankruptcy procedure in the U.S. is called liquidation).   Debtors’ wealth 
consists of two components:  financial wealth (including home equity) and human 
capital.  The only way to liquidate the human capital portion of individual debtors’ 
wealth would be to sell debtors into slavery—as the Romans did.   Since slavery is no 
longer used as a penalty for bankruptcy, all personal  bankruptcy procedures are forms of 
reorganization in which individual debtors keep their human capital and the right to use it 
(or not use it) after bankruptcy. 
        The economic objectives are similar in corporate and personal bankruptcy.  One 
objective of bankruptcy is to repay creditors enough that credit remains available on 
reasonable terms.  Reduced access to credit makes debtors worse off because businesses 
need to borrow in order to start up and grow and individuals benefit from borrowing to 
smooth consumption.  On the other hand, repaying more to creditors harms debtors by 
making it more difficult for financially distressed firms to survive and more onerous for 
financially distressed individuals to work.  Both the optimal size and division of the pie in 
                                                 
2 Both Britain and the U.S. used debtors’ prison as a punishment for bankruptcy during the nineteenth 
century and, in earlier periods, Britain occasionally used the death penalty against debtors who defrauded 
their creditors.   While prison and the death penalty waste debtors’ human capital, they presumably cause 
debtors to use their financial assets to repay debt even though the assets could otherwise be hidden from 
creditors.   See Baird (1987).       4 
bankruptcy are affected by this tradeoff.  A related objective is to give both corporate and 
personal debtors an incentive to invest and consume efficiently before and after they 
become financial distressed.  Another objective of both types of bankruptcy is to prevent 
creditors from harming debtors by racing to be first to collect.  This is because aggressive 
collection efforts by creditors may force debtor firms to shut down even though the best 
use of their assets is to continue operating and may cause individual debtors to lose their 
jobs (if creditors repossess debtors’ cars or garnish debtors’ wages).  Finally, personal 
bankruptcy law has an additional objective that has no counterpart in corporate 
bankruptcy—to provide individual debtors with partial consumption insurance by 
discharging debt when repayment would cause a substantial reduction in debtors’ 
consumption levels.   This is because if consumption falls substantially, long-term harm 
may occur, including debtors’ children leaving school prematurely in order to work or 
debtors’ medical conditions going untreated and becoming disabilities.
3         
       In 1984, there were approximately 62,000 business bankruptcy filings and 286,000 
filings by individuals and married couples. By twenty years later in 2004, the number of 
business bankruptcy filings had fallen in half to 34,000, while the number of filings by 
individuals and married couples had increased more than five-fold to 1,583,000.
4   
Concern about the rising number of individual bankruptcies led Congress to adopt 
reforms of personal bankruptcy law in 2005.      
     Part one of this chapter deals with corporate bankruptcy and part two with individual 
and small business bankruptcy.  Each part contains separate sections that outline the law, 
discuss theoretical research, and present the empirical evidence.  A third topic that is not 
discussed—because it has received little attention from economists--is governmental or 
sovereign bankruptcy.
5   
                                                 
3 Baird (1987) points out that discharge of debt in bankruptcy originally applied only to merchants and was 
intended to prevent them from being forced to close their businesses if an adverse event occurred for 
reasons beyond their control (such as a merchant ship sinking).  Thus discharge provided a type of 
insurance to business owners.   Over time, discharge expanded from covering only business debt to 
covering  individual debt.  But it gradually became less important for business debt as the corporate form 
and limited liability developed.     
4 See Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1988, table 837, and Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts (for recent years). 
5 Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a bankruptcy procedure for local governments.   It does 
not apply to state or county governments and has been used only rarely.  See McConnell and Picker (1993) 
for discussion.  There is currently no bankruptcy procedure for countries that default, although the   5 
 
Part One: Corporate Bankruptcy 
 
 
I.  Legal Background  --  Corporate Bankruptcy Law  
 
      The U.S. has two separate bankruptcy procedures for corporations in financial 
distress, Chapter 7 for liquidation and Chapter 11 for reorganization.  In this section I 
discuss the two Chapters separately and then discuss out-of-bankruptcy resolution of 
financial distress.    
   
A.  Chapter 7 Liquidation.    
     When a corporation firm files under Chapter 7, the bankruptcy court appoints a trustee 
who shuts the firm down, sells its assets, distributes the proceeds to the firm’s creditors, 
and dissolves the corporation.  Legal efforts by creditors to collect from the firm are 
terminated and all creditors’ claims must be resolved in the bankruptcy proceeding, 
regardless of whether they come due in the present or the future.  The APR is used to 
determine the division of the liquidated assets among creditors.  The APR carries over to 
the bankruptcy context the non-bankruptcy rule that creditors must be paid in full before 
equityholders receive anything, thus preserving creditors’ non-bankruptcy rights vis-à-vis 
equityholders.  But the APR also advances other claims so that they take priority over 
debt claims in bankruptcy.   The highest priority under the APR goes to the 
administrative expenses of the bankruptcy process itself (including filing fees, lawyers’ 
fees and the trustee’s fee); followed by claims taking statutory priority (including tax 
claims, rent claims, and some unpaid wage and benefit claims); followed by unsecured 
creditors’ claims (including trade creditors, bondholders, and those holding tort 
judgments against the firm).  Equity has the lowest priority.     Claims in each class are 
paid in full until funds are exhausted.   
                                                                                                                                                 
International Monetary Fund has considered establishing one.  There are several important differences 
between sovereign bankruptcy and corporate/personal bankruptcy.  One is that creditors have very limited 
collection options against sovereign debtors, so that the race to be first among creditors is less important.  
Another is that the cost of default is very high, since default usually leads to a severe recession in the 
country’s economy.  Unlike bankrupt corporations but like bankrupt individuals, countries can only be 
reorganized (“restructured”), not liquidated.   A final difference is that when countries default, the IMF 
plays an important role in restructuring negotiations.   See White (2002) for discussion.     6 
       Within the class of unsecured claims, various rankings are consistent with the APR.  
If there are subordination agreements that place certain unsecured claims above others, 
then these are followed in bankruptcy.  In the literature, the best-known ranking is the 
“me-first” rule of Fama and Miller (1972), under which unsecured claims take priority in 
chronological order based on when creditors made their loans.  The opposite of the “me-
first” rule is the “last-lender-first” rule, under which priority is in reverse chronological 
order.  If there are no subordination agreements, then all unsecured claims have equal 
priority. 
      Secured creditors are outside the priority ordering.  They have bargained with the 
firm for the right to seize a particular asset if the firm defaults and/or files for bankruptcy.  
Thus only assets that are not subject to secured creditors’ liens are included in the pool of 
assets used to pay other creditors.   When firms liquidate in bankruptcy, often all or 
nearly all of their assets are subject to secured creditors’ lien, so that other creditors 
receive nothing.      
     When creditors realize that a debtor firm might be insolvent, they have an incentive to 
race against each other to be first to collect.  This is because, as in a bank run, the earliest 
creditors to collect will be paid in full, but later creditors will receive nothing.   The race 
to be first is inefficient, since the first creditor to collect may seize assets that the firm 
needs for its operations and, as a result, may force the firm to shut down.  Early shutdown 
wastes resources because the piecemeal value of the firm’s assets may be less than their 
value if the assets are kept together and the firm sold as a going concern.  However the 
existence of bankruptcy mutes creditors’ incentive to race to be first.  This is because 
when one creditor wins the race and tries to collect by seizing assets, the firm’s managers 
are likely to file for bankruptcy.  And because bankruptcy is a collective procedure that 
settles all claims at once according to the APR, a bankruptcy filing deprives creditors of 
their reward for winning the race.  Muting creditors’ incentive to race to be first by 
imposing a collective procedure for resolving all of the firm’s debts is the traditional 
economic justification for bankruptcy (Jackson, 1986).   
         But bankruptcy does not abolish creditors’ incentive to compete with each other.  
Instead, it replaces the race to be first to collect with a competition among creditors to 
leapfrog over each other in the priority ordering.   The most common method by which   7 
creditors raise their priority is to shift from unsecured to secured status.  They do this by 
negotiating with managers to renew their loans in return for obtaining a lien on a 
particular asset owned by the firm or, if the creditor is a bank, by requiring that the firm 
keep funds in an account at the bank (since these funds act as collateral for the bank’s 
loan).   If the firm is planning to file under Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 7, then another 
leapfrogging method is for creditors to raise their priority is to renew their loans after the 
firm files for bankruptcy, since doing so makes the loan an administrative expense of 
bankruptcy that takes highest priority.   But when creditors compete to raise their priority 
in bankruptcy, the result is often that firms delay filing for bankruptcy because creditors 
renew their loans in return for higher priority.  This delay is inefficient if the best use of 
the firm’s assets is something other than their current use.    
      Bankruptcy liquidation procedures in other countries are similar to the U.S. 
procedure.  But in the United Kingdom, one type of creditor, called a “floating charge” 
creditor, has the right to prevent managers from filing for bankruptcy.   If the firm 
defaults, the floating charge creditor may liquidate any assets of the firm that are not 
subject to secured creditors’ claims. Only after the floating charge creditor is repaid in 
full does the bankruptcy trustee begin to liquidate the firm’s remaining assets for the 
benefit of other creditors.  The partial liquidation by the floating charge creditor may 
cause firms to shut down even though their assets are more valuable if they continue to 
operate.
6   
  
B.  Chapter 11 Reorganization.   
   In the U.S., managers of corporations in financial distress have the right to choose 
between filing for bankruptcy liquidation under Chapter 7 versus for bankruptcy 
reorganization under Chapter 11.  Under Chapter 11, the firm continues to operate and 
pre-bankruptcy managers usually remain in control as “debtors-in-possession.”   A 
reorganization plan must eventually be adopted that resolves all of the firm’s debts.  
Under the plan, firms repay part or all of their debt from future earnings, rather than from 
selling their assets.     
                                                 
6 Webb (1991) analyzes U.K. bankruptcy procedures as a prisoner’s dilemma and argues that, as a result, 
too much liquidation occurs.   See also Franks and Sussman (2005).    8 
         Chapter 11 includes a number of provisions that are intended to aid financially 
distressed firms and increase the likelihood that they will continue operating.  Creditors’ 
efforts to collect from the firm are stayed and debtor firms cease making  interest and 
principle payments to creditors until a reorganization plan goes into effect (although the 
firm must continue paying interest on secured loans).  Also with the bankruptcy court’s 
approval, firms in Chapter 11 may obtain new loans and give post-bankruptcy lenders 
highest priority, even though much of the payoff to post-bankruptcy creditors is likely to 
come at the expense of pre-bankruptcy creditors.    This gives firms in Chapter 11 a new 
source of working capital.  Also, firms in Chapter 11 are allowed to reject their 
unprofitable contracts and their traditional pension plans.  Penalties for breach of contract 
become unsecured debts, so that they receive only a fractional payoff; while 
responsibility for meeting the obligations of under-funded pension plans goes to the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation—a U.S. government agency.  Firms that 
reorganize successfully also escape the obligation to pay taxes on debt forgiveness until 
they become profitable.  These provisions greatly improve the cash flow of firms in 
Chapter 11.  
        Firms in Chapter 11 must adopt reorganization plans that resolve all of their debts.   
Because the reorganized firm retains some or all of its pre-bankruptcy assets and pays 
creditors from its future earnings, the reorganization plan determines both the size of the 
pie and its division among creditors.  Bankruptcy law affects the size and division of the 
pie by setting procedures both for bargaining over the terms of reorganization plans and 
for adopting them.  For at least the first four months after the bankruptcy filing, managers 
have the exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan and creditors have only a take-
it-or-leave-it choice.  Managers’ exclusive right to propose the plan reduces the size of 
the pie, because managers have an incentive to propose the smallest pie that creditors will 
accept.  Furthermore, bankruptcy judges often extend managers’ exclusivity period and 
this also reduces the size of the pie, since additional delay makes creditors willing to 
accept less.   The most commonly-used procedure for adopting a reorganization plan is a 
voting procedure.  Under it, each class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan by a 
margin of at least two-thirds in amount and one-half in number of claims and, in addition, 
two-thirds of all pre-bankruptcy equityholders must vote in favor.  The less-than-100%   9 
voting requirement also reduces the size of the pie, because the plan does not have to 
satisfy the demands of holdout creditors in each class.  Also the requirement that all 
classes of creditors and pre-bankruptcy equityholders vote in favor of the plan means that 
even low-priority creditors and equityholders receive positive payoffs in reorganization.
7   
         The rules of Chapter 11 also provide some protection for creditors.  Reorganization 
plans that have met the voting requirements for adoption must also be confirmed by the 
bankruptcy judge.  For a plan to be confirmed, the judge must decide that it meets the 
“best interest of creditors” test, which requires that each class of creditors receive at least 
what it would have received if the firm liquidated under Chapter 7.   If the reorganization 
plan was rejected by one or more classes of creditors, then the judge can use “cramdown” 
to confirm the plan.   Cramdown requires that classes of creditors that have rejected the 
plan receive either full payment of their claims over the period of the plan (usually 6 
years) or else that all lower-ranking classes of creditors receive nothing.  Alternately, the 
judge may allow creditors to offer their own reorganization plans, may replace managers, 
or may order that the firm be sold as a going concern under Chapter 11 or liquidated 
under Chapter 7.  If the firm is sold under either Chapter, then the proceeds are 
distributed according to the APR.  Thus, regardless of how firms emerge from Chapter 
11, creditors must either receive as much or more than they would receive if the firm 
liquidated under Chapter 7.  
       Chapter 11 thus substitutes a bargaining process and a voting procedure for the actual 
sale of firms’ assets that occurs in Chapter 7.  In theory, the overall size of the pie and 
each creditor’s individual slice must be at least as large in reorganization as in 
liquidation, since the “best interest of creditors” test requires that each class of creditors 
receive as much or more in reorganization as in liquidation.  But in practice the size of 
the pie in reorganization could be smaller than in liquidation.  This is because managers 
of large corporations rarely choose Chapter 7 when they file for bankruptcy, so that when 
large corporations liquidate, it is generally only after they have operated for prolonged 
                                                 
7 See Bebchuk and Chang (1992) for a common knowledge model of the bargaining process in Chapter 11 
that uses the Rubinstein alternating offer bargaining game.  They show how rules that favor 
managers/equity, such as giving managers the exclusive right to propose the first reorganization plan and 
requiring that the class of equityholders consents to the plan, reduce the amount that creditors receive.   
Other models of bargaining in Chapter 11include Brown (1989), Baird and Picker (1991), and Aivazian and 
Callen (1983).     10 
periods in Chapter 11.  While in Chapter 11, managers have little incentive to operate 
their firms efficiently and often bankruptcy court supervision fails to prevent waste and 
asset-stripping.  When these firms eventually liquidate, the value of their assets tends to 
be very low.  This means that even a low payoff to creditors in reorganization exceeds 
what they expect to receive in liquidation.
8  In addition, the division of the pie differs 
sharply in reorganization versus liquidation.  In liquidation, high-priority creditors 
receive full payment and lower-priority creditors and equity receiving nothing; while in 
reorganization, each class of creditors receives partial payment and equity receives some 
of the shares of the reorganized firm.  Unsecured creditors and equity must receive 
something in order to obtain their votes for the reorganization plan, so that they get more 
in reorganization than in liquidation.  But secured creditors usually receive less, because 
Chapter 11 delays or prevents them from seizing their collateral and the interest they 
receive is often insufficient to compensate them for the delay.  Transfers from higher-
priority to lower-priority creditors and/or from creditors to equityholders under Chapter 
11 are referred to in the literature as “deviations from the APR.”  As will be discussed 
below, many economists have argued that the negotiation process in reorganization is 
itself economically inefficient and should be replaced.   
          The United Kingdom, France and Germany have all adopted new bankruptcy 
procedures recently that were intended to encourage reorganization of firms in financial 
distress.  These procedures differ substantially from Chapter 11 and also differ 
substantially among themselves.  In all three countries, pre-bankruptcy managers are 
given much less power over the reorganization process than they have in Chapter 11.  
Instead, the bankruptcy judge or an official appointed by the judge decides whether the 
firm will shut down or reorganize and, if reorganization is chosen, formulates the 
reorganization plan.  In France, bankruptcy officials appointed to decide whether firms in 
bankruptcy will be liquidated or reorganized have “safeguarding the business” and saving  
jobs as their primary objectives.  However in the United Kingdom and Germany, 
                                                 
8 The best-known example is Eastern Airlines, which filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in 1989 and 
continued to operate for nearly two years. While in bankruptcy, its value fell by $2 billion.  Many of its 
assets were sold to fund continued operating losses.  When it finally shut down, secured creditors received 
82% of their claims, unsecured creditors received 11%, and equity received nothing.  See Weiss and Wruck 
(1998) for a detailed analysis.        11 
bankruptcy procedures are more pro-creditor than in the U.S. or France and 
reorganization is less likely to occur.
9   
 
C.  Non-bankruptcy workouts.  
    Because bankruptcy involves high transactions costs, managers of corporations in 
financial distress often attempt to avoid it by renegotiating the firm’s debts outside of 
bankruptcy.  These renegotiations, called workouts, are common in the U.S. (see below 
for evidence).  
   Workout negotiations usually involve managers proposing a plan for creditors to 
forgive part of the firm’s debt and creditors deciding whether to accept or reject.  
Economists have pointed out two reasons why workouts tend to fail.  One is the problem 
of strategic default, meaning that if creditors accept workout proposals, then managers 
have an incentive to offer them even when their firms are not in financial distress.  
Creditors can only discourage strategic default by rejecting workouts.  The second is that 
individual creditors have an incentive to reject workout proposals and act as holdouts.  
This is because if most creditors accept the workout, then the debtor firm will repay the 
holdouts in full or at least strike a better deal with them.  But if all creditors choose to be 
holdouts, then workout proposals will fail.  Managers in turn have two ways to increase 
the probability that workout proposals succeed.  One is that if the workout proposal is 
supported by at least two-thirds of creditors in each class (by value), then managers can 
file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and use the workout proposal as the firm’s 
reorganization plan.  This is because, in bankruptcy, only a two-thirds majority of each 
class of creditors is needed for adoption of the plan.  Using a workout proposal as a 
Chapter 11 reorganization plan is referred to as a prepackaged bankruptcy, or “prepack.”  
Even though prepacks involve a bankruptcy filing, they are much quicker and less costly 
than normal bankruptcies.  Managers’ other method of increasing the probability that 
workouts are accepted is to make “coercive offers.”  Under the Trust Indenture Act of 
1939, the financial terms of a bond issue cannot be changed outside of bankruptcy 
                                                 
9 For comparisons between corporate bankruptcy reorganization procedures in the U.S. and other countries, 
see Franks, Nybourg, and Torous (1994), White (1996), Berkovitch and Israel (1998), and Franks and 
Sussman (2005).    
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without the unanimous consent of bondholders, but non-financial terms can be changed 
by majority vote.  Therefore managers offer a workout that involves a reduced payment 
to bondholders combined with changes in the non-financial terms that make the bond 
issue less valuable--such as ending public trading.  If a majority of bondholders accepts 
the offer, then the changes in the non-financial terms go into effect and the holdouts are 
made worse off.  Coercive offers give bondholders an incentive to accept workouts.
10  
As discussed above, individual creditors also have an incentive to improve their 
position in the priority ordering by negotiating individually with managers before 
managers propose a workout or file for bankruptcy.   Banks and other short-term 
creditors have frequent opportunities to initiate negotiate with managers, since their loans 
come due frequently and are generally renegotiated and renewed.  Long-term debts come 
due less frequently, but debt contracts contain clauses that allow creditors to declare the 
loan in default whenever any pre-specified event occurs, such as the firm’s working 
capital falling below a certain level.  Default accelerates the due date of the loan from the 
future to the present and therefore presents creditors with an opportunity to renegotiate.  
Long-term debt contracts often contain thousands of such clauses.
11   Creditors are 
generally better off when they negotiate individually with managers than when they 
participate in a collective negotiation such as a workout or a bankruptcy reorganization.    
 
    
     II.  Research on Corporate Bankruptcy--Theory  
    
A.    Effects of Priority Rules on the Bankruptcy Decision, Managerial Effort, and 
the Choice Between Safe versus Risky Investments    
 
Priority rules in bankruptcy affect the efficiency of managers’ decisions both to 
invest in safe versus risky investment projects and to file for bankruptcy versus remain 
out of bankruptcy.   If managers invest in risky projects when safe projects have higher 
expected returns, then the additional return from the safe project is lost, and vice versa.  If 
                                                 
10 See Roe (1987), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), and Schwartz (1993) for discussion and  Kahan and 
Tuckman (1993) for a theoretical model which shows that coercive offers may succeed.  Kahan and 
Tuckman also present empirical evidence that coercive offers do not make bondholders worse off, but their 
sample excludes firms in financial distress.   Coercive offers are also used in renegotiation of sovereign 
debt.  See White (2002).      
11 See Smith and Warner (1979) for discussion.    13 
managers choose to avoid bankruptcy and continue the firm’s operations, but its assets 
are more valuable in some alternate use, then resources are wasted.  Conversely when 
managers choose liquidation but continuation has a higher expected return, the cost is that 
the firm’s assets are shifted to alternative uses when they would be worth more if they 
remained together in their current use.
12  When managers invest inefficiently or make 
inefficient bankruptcy decisions, creditors’ return is likely to be lower and they respond 
by raising interest rates and/or reducing credit availability.    
It should be noted that models of the economic effects of priority rules include their 
effects on both the size and division of the pie.  When “deviations from the APR” occur, 
the firm’s pre-bankruptcy equityholders receive a positive payoff (rather than zero) and 
its creditors receive less.  Thus deviations from the APR imply that the size of the pie 
falls.  When one group of creditors leapfrogs over another, the division of the pie 
changes.  But the size of the pie may also change if the firm’s investment behavior is 
affected.       
In this section, I first discuss basic models that illustrate these points and then turn 
to extensions, including models with asymmetric or incomplete information.      
 
 
1.  Models with complete information.
  
          Turn first to models of the bankruptcy decision.
13  Suppose a firm is in financial 
distress and managers—representing equity--are considering whether to file for 
bankruptcy.   Assume initially that the only bankruptcy procedure is liquidation, so that 
managers’ bankruptcy decision is a choice between liquidating the firm in bankruptcy 
versus continuing to operate the firm outside of bankruptcy.  Managers make 
economically efficient choices if they file for bankruptcy whenever the firm’s assets are 
more valuable in alternate uses and continue to operate whenever the firm’s assets are 
                                                 
12 Railroads are an important example of firms whose assets are worth more if they remain together.  
Reorganization in the U.S. began as a procedure to prevent secured creditors from seizing and selling the 
track of financially distressed railroads, since track is worth little if it is dispersed.  See Baird (1987) and 
Warren (1935).     
13 See Bulow and Shoven (1978), White (1980), (1983) and (1989), and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991).   
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more valuable in their current use.  Assume that managers and creditors are fully 
informed about the value of the firm’s assets in both their current and alternate uses.    
         Suppose the firm has total debt of D, divided between  1 D  due in period 1 and  2 D  
due in period 2, where  2 1 D D D + = .  The firm has no cash on hand.  The liquidation 
value of the firm’s assets in period 1 is L and, since  D L < , it is insolvent.  Managers can 
either file for bankruptcy in period 1 or continue the firm’s operations outside of 
bankruptcy until period 2.  In order for continuation to occur, managers must obtain a 
new loan that allows the firm to repay  1 D  in period 1.  The new lender, if one exists, is 
referred to as the bank and it must lend an amount  1 2 D B = .  If the firm continues to 
operate, it earns  2 P  with certainty in period 2, but the liquidation value of its assets falls 
to zero.  Ignoring the time value of money, continuation in period 1 is economically 
efficient if  L P > 2  and liquidation is economically efficient otherwise.  At the end of 
period 2, assume that the firm is liquidated and the amount  2 P  is distributed according to 
the APR.  Priority among creditors in liquidation is according to “me-first,” i.e., debts are 
paid in chronological order based on when the loans were made.      
      The bank and managers—representing equity--are assumed to act as a coalition in 
making the bankruptcy decision in period 1, so that the bank makes the loan if 
continuation benefits the bank and equity taken together.  If the firm liquidates in period 
1, equity receives nothing since  L D > .   If the bank lends and the firm continues to 
operate, the coalition receives max[ 2 2 D P - ,0] in period 2, so that its net return is 
2 2 2 ] 0 , max[ B D P - - .  (This is because the debt  2 D  has priority over the bank loan.)  In 
order for the coalition to form and continuation to occur, this expression must be positive, 
which implies that  D D B P = + > 2 2 2 .  Since  L D > , this means that  L P > 2 .  Thus the 
coalition chooses continuation only when it is economically efficient.  However this 
efficiency result is one-sided, since the coalition sometimes chooses liquidation even 
when continuation is more efficient.  Suppose  D P L < < 2 .  Then the coalition chooses 
liquidation, but continuation is more efficient.   
        Thus the result under the APR and the “me-first” rule is that too much liquidation 
occurs.  This is because continuation increases the value of the debt 2 D , but managers   15 
and the bank ignore this gain because they do not share it.  This result is an example of 
Myers’ (1977) “debt overhang” problem, since inefficient liquidation is more likely to 
occur when the firm’s debt is high.  
      Now suppose the APR continues to hold, but priority among creditors is according to 
“last-lender-first.”   Then if the bank lends, its loan takes priority over the debt  2 D  in 
period 2.   In this situation, the coalition receives the first  2 B dollars of the firm’s 
earnings in period 2, none of the next  2 D  dollars, and all of the firm’s earnings above 
. 2 2 D B +    The condition for the coalition to form and the firm to continue operating 
therefore becomes  2 2 B P ‡ .  Therefore continuation is more likely to occur when “last-
lender-first” priority is used than when “me-first” priority is used.  Using the insolvency 
condition, the condition for continuation to occur can be expressed as  2 2 2 D L B P - ‡ ‡ , 
while the condition for continuation to be efficient is L P ‡ 2 .   Thus under the “last-
lender-first” rule, less inefficient liquidation and more inefficient continuation occur, 
because continuing the firm increases the value of the coalition at the expense of the debt 
2 D .  The additional continuation is an example of how leapfrogging by creditors may 
reduce economic efficiency—here the increase in the bank’s priority relative to the debt 
2 D  increases the probability of continuation even though liquidation may be more 
efficient.
14       
       Now suppose the firm’s period 2 earnings are uncertain rather than certain.  To keep 
the model simple, assume that period 2 earnings under continuation are either  G P + 2  or 
G P - 2 , each with .5 probability.  Also assume that  G P D G P - ‡ ‡ + 2 2 2 .   Suppose 
again that the “me-first” rule applies, so that the debt  2 D  has priority over the bank’s 
continuation loan.  Under these assumptions, the coalition’s expected return if 
continuation is chosen is  2 2 2 ) ( 5 . B D G P - - +  (since the coalition gets nothing if the firm 
is unsuccessful in period 2).  This implies that the coalition chooses continuation if 
G D B P - + ‡ 2 2 2 2 , but continuation is only efficient if  . 2 L P ‡   Thus if 
                                                 
14 See Bebchuk and Fried (1996) for an article questioning whether secured creditors should receive 
priority in bankruptcy.   The model discussed here, in which last-lender-first priority is substituted for me-
first priority, can alternately be interpreted as an illustration of the effect of a creditor shifting from 
unsecured to secured status.  As the discussion shows, the shift increases the probability of inefficient 
continuation.   See also Stulz and Johnson (1985).         16 
L P G D B < < - + 2 2 2 2 , then continuation occurs but liquidation is more efficient, and if 
G D B P L - + < < 2 2 2 2 , then liquidation occurs but continuation is more efficient.  As 
the firm’s earnings become more uncertain (G rises), inefficient continuation is more 
likely to occur.  This is because the coalition gains when the firm’s return is risky, since it 
keeps the additional return in the good outcome, but shares the loss with the other 
creditor in the bad outcome.   These results illustrate the moral hazard problem pointed 
out by Stiglitz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) that, in the presence of debt, 
managers favor risky projects over safe ones, even if risky projects offer lower expected 
returns, because equity gains disproportionately from risky projects if they succeed.  This 
effect applies to the firm’s bankruptcy decision as well as to investment decisions more 
generally.
15 
Now suppose Chapter 11 reorganization is introduced into the analysis.  Suppose in 
period 1 the coalition chooses among liquidation under Chapter 7, reorganization under 
Chapter 11, or continuation outside of bankruptcy.  Under Chapter 11, the firm does not 
have to repay the debt  1 D  in period 1, but it must obtain a loan of T in period 1 to cover 
the transactions costs of the reorganization process.  Assume that at the beginning of 
period 2, the firm adopts a reorganization plan that requires it to repay a fraction r of the 
debts  1 D  and  2 D .  These payments are made in period 2.
16   Therefore the amount that 
the bank must lend the firm in order for the coalition to form is T  rather than 1 D .  
Assuming that  1 D T < , the difference  T D - 1  represents the improvement in the firm’s 
immediate cash flow that occurs when it files under Chapter 11.  Assume also that the 
bank’s loan takes post-petition priority over the firm’s other debts as an expense of 
reorganization.  Finally, assume that  T D D r G P + + > + ) ( 2 1 2  and  T G P > - 2 .  Then if 
the firm reorganizes, the coalition’s expected return net of the cost of the loan is 
T T D D r G P - + + - + 5 . )) ( ( 5 . 2 1 2 .  Here the coalition receives  ) ( 2 1 2 D D r G P + - + if 
the firm is successful in period 2 and  T if the firm is unsuccessful. The coalition 
                                                 
15 The bias toward too much continuation becomes stronger when the bank is also the lender that is owed 
1 D .  In this case the bank’s opportunity cost of joining the coalition falls since it does not have to provide 
new funds.      
16 Alternately if the two debts had different priority, they might receive different repayment rates under the 
reorganization plan.     17 
therefore prefers reorganization to both liquidation and continuation outside of 
bankruptcy if   ] 0 , ) ( 5 max[. ) ) ( ( 5 . 2 2 2 2 1 2 B D G P T D D r G P - - + > - + - + .  
Reorganization is more likely to be preferred to liquidation as G increases and 
reorganization is more likely to be preferred to both liquidation and continuation as  T 
and r fall.   Thus the introduction of reorganization as an alternative bankruptcy option 
makes it more likely that the firm will continue operating rather than liquidate, although 
it may operate in Chapter 11 rather than outside of bankruptcy.  Relative to continuation, 
reorganization benefits the coalition by reducing the cost of the loan that the bank must 
provide in period 1 and by forgiving a proportion (1 - r) of the firm’s debt.  But these 
benefits have little to do with whether it is economically efficient for the firm to continue 
operating.  Since reorganization is economically efficient only when  L P > 2 , the increase 
in the probability of failing firms continuing to operate is likely to be inefficient.   
        Now turn to the effect of priority rules on the efficiency of investment decisions that 
managers make ex ante, when the firm is not in financial distress.  Bebchuk (2003) 
examines a model in which each firm has only one creditor, so that the only priority rules 
considered are the APR versus deviations from the APR.  Bebchuk characterizes both as 
a proportional sharing rule under which equity gets a fraction a of the value of the firm’s 
assets in bankruptcy.  In Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation, there are no deviations from 
the APR, so that  0 = a .  In Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, deviations from the 
APR occur, so that  0 > a .  Bebchuk assumes that creditors lend only if they expect to 
make zero profits.  If the value of a  changes, creditors adjust the interest rate so that 
expected profits remain equal to zero, i.e., they cannot be cheated by priority rule 
changes.
17   
     Bebchuk compares the efficiency of ex ante investment incentives under the APR 
versus  deviations from the APR.  He shows, first, that at a given interest rate, 
equityholders are more likely to choose risky over safe investment projects when 
deviations from the APR occur.  When there are no deviations from the APR, 
equityholders have an incentive to favor risky over safe projects because they receive all 
                                                 
17 See below for empirical evidence concerning the size of a .   Cornelli and Felli (1997) also model the 
effect of priority rules on ex ante efficiency.     
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of the return net of interest payments when the project succeeds, but creditors bear most 
of the loss when the project fails.  Deviations from the APR further increase the 
attractiveness of risky relative to safe projects, since equity’s return remains the same 
when the project succeeds, but rises when the project fails.  Second, Bebchuk shows that 
creditors raise the interest rate when a  rises, both because equityholders are more likely 
to choose risky projects and because creditors gets less when failure occurs.  Finally, 
higher interest rates further increase the likelihood that equityholders choose risky 
projects, since when interest rates are high, only investments that have very high upside 
returns allow managers to repay costly debt and still have something left over for equity 
if the investment succeeds.  Thus introducing Chapter 11 as an alternative to Chapter 7 
distorts the efficiency of investment incentives and causes equity to favor inefficiently 
risky projects even more strongly.   The larger is a , the worse the distortion. 
       Bebchuk also uses his model to examine how priority rules affect the efficiency of 
investment incentives ex post, when firms are already in financial distress.  He shows that 
in this situation, the results are reversed and deviations from the APR reduce rather than 
increase equityholders’ bias toward risky investment projects.  This is because when the 
project is likely to fail and the firm to file for bankruptcy, equityholders’ main return 
comes from their share a  of the firm’s value in bankruptcy.  Therefore the safer the 
project, the more equity receives.  As a result, if Chapter 11 reorganization is substituted 
for Chapter 7 liquidation as the bankruptcy procedure, there is an ambiguous overall 
effect on the efficiency of managers’ investment decisions:  they become less efficient ex 
ante but more efficient ex post.
18 
 Overall, these models suggest that none of the commonly-used priority rules in 
bankruptcy always give managers/equityholders incentives to make efficient bankruptcy 
decisions or efficient investment choices.  When firms are financially distressed and their 
future earnings are certain, the me-first and last-lender-first versions of the APR may 
result in either too much liquidation or too much continuation.  As firms’ future earnings 
become more uncertain, inefficient continuation is more likely to occur.   When 
                                                 
18 In the context of the model discussed above, equityholders receive  ) ( 2 G P - a  when the project fails, 
where failure is assumed to occur with high probability.  Assuming that a  is positive (Chapter 11 is in 
effect), equity’s return rises as G falls, i.e., as the project becomes safer.          19 
reorganization is introduced as a third bankruptcy option, the bias toward inefficient 
continuation becomes yet stronger.  When the alternatives are no deviations from the 
APR versus deviations from the APR, then deviations from the APR worsen managers’ 
bias toward choosing inefficiently risky investment projects ex ante, but have the 
opposite effect ex post.  Although other priority rules might theoretically result in 
efficient bankruptcy and investment decisions, no general rule has been proposed.
19   
 
2. Models with asymmetric or incomplete information.      
       Turn now to “filtering failure.”  Suppose there are two types of financially distressed 
firms:  type 1 firms that are economically efficient and should reorganize versus type 2 
firms that are economically inefficient and should liquidate.  In the first-best bankruptcy 
outcome, all type 1 firms would reorganize and all type 2 firms would liquidate.  
“Filtering failure” occurs in bankruptcy whenever type 1 firms liquidate and/or type 2 
firms reorganize.  White (1994) examined an asymmetric information model of filtering 
failure under which managers of failing firms are assumed to know their firms’ type, but 
creditors do not.  The structure of the model incorporates features of U.S. bankruptcy 
law, including managers’ right to choose between Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11, 
managers’ right to offer the first reorganization plan under Chapter 11, and creditors’ 
right to accept or reject managers’ proposed plan.  But the model ignores conflicts of 
interest among creditors.       
       Managers of type 1 firms always file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, but they 
choose between offering reorganization plans with high versus low payoff rates to 
creditors.  Managers of type 2 firms choose between filing under Chapter 7 versus 
Chapter 11.  If they file under Chapter 11, then they offer the same low-payoff 
reorganization plans as type 1 firms.  Creditors must decide whether to accept or reject 
managers’ reorganization plans without knowing individual firms’ types.  Creditors 
always accept high-payoff reorganization plans, but they may either accept or reject low-
                                                 
19 See the discussion of contracting about bankruptcy below for discussion of alternate priority rules that 
achieve efficiency in particular models.  These generally involve creditors promising to bribe managers to 
liquidate rather than reorganize in bankruptcy.    
 
   20 
payoff plans.  If creditors accept low-payoff plans, then the plans go into effect and the 
game ends.  If creditors reject low-payoff plans, then they are assumed to learn individual 
firms’ types (because the bankruptcy judge replaces managers and gives creditors more 
control).  If the firm turns out to be type 1, then creditors receive a higher payoff than if 
they had accepted managers’ plan; but if the firm turns out to be type 2, then it liquidates 
and creditors receive less than if they had accepted.   Thus rejecting a low-payoff 
reorganization plan is a gamble for creditors.  Managers of both types of firms also 
gamble when they offer low-payoff plans rather than choosing their alternative strategy, 
since they are better off if creditors accept these plans but worse off if creditors reject.    
      I show that either efficient filtering or filtering failure may occur in equilibrium, 
depending on the proportion of firms in financial distress that are type 1 versus type 2.  If 
most distressed firms are type 1, then creditors always reject low-payoff reorganization 
plans since their expected return when they reject these plans is higher.  Therefore all 
type 1 firms offer high payment reorganization plans under Chapter 11 and all type 2 
firms liquidate under Chapter 7.  A separating equilibrium occurs in which there is no 
filtering failure.  But if most distressed firms are type 2, then creditors always accept low-
payoff plans and, as a result, managers of both types of firms always offer them.   A 
pooling equilibrium therefore occurs in which there is filtering failure, since all type 2 
firms reorganize when they should liquidate.  There also may be mixed strategy equilibria 
in which some type 2 firms reorganize and others liquidate.  The model thus suggests that 
filtering failure may occur in bankruptcy and that it takes the form of too much 
reorganization. 
        Now turn to strategic default and its interaction with bankruptcy costs.  Suppose 
firms are either solvent or insolvent, and again only managers know their firms’ types.  
Because the bankruptcy process is costly, it is efficient for firms that are in financial 
distress to avoid filing for bankruptcy by negotiating non-bankruptcy workouts.  Suppose 
managers of both types of firms choose whether to propose a workout that will reduce 
payments to creditors.  If managers propose a workout, then creditors must either accept 
or reject without knowing their firms’ types.  Creditors have an incentive to accept 
workout proposals, since accepting allows the firm to avoid filing for bankruptcy.  But if 
creditors accept all workout proposals, then managers have an incentive to default   21 
strategically by proposing workouts even when their firms are solvent.  In order to 
discourage strategic behavior, creditors must therefore reject some or all of managers’ 
workout proposals.  But if creditors reject workouts, then at least some firms in financial 
distress must end up in bankruptcy.  The model thus implies that, when information is 
asymmetric, either some strategic default or some costly bankruptcy (or a combination of 
both) must occur.
20                                        
       A similar tradeoff occurs in financial contracting models.
21  The financial contracting 
literature considers the optimal method of financing investment projects when 
entrepreneurs/managers have projects but no cash and investor have cash but no projects.  
Suppose an investor lends D dollars to an entrepreneur in period 0.  In period 1, the 
project either succeeds or fails.  If it succeeds, then it generates a return of  D R > 2 in 
period 2 and an additional return of  D R > 3  in period 3.  If it fails, then it earns zero in 
period 2, but it still earns  3 R  in period 3.  Also assume that the project’s assets have a 
positive liquidation value of L in period 2, but zero in period 3.  Since  L R > 3 , it is 
efficient for the project to continue until period 3 regardless of whether it succeeds or 
fails.     
         Information is assumed to be incomplete in the sense that, while all parties can 
observe the firm’s returns each period, investors and entrepreneurs cannot make a 
contract based on the firm’s returns because they are not verifiable in court.  But they can 
contract for entrepreneurs to make a fixed dollar payment to investors at a particular time 
and for investors to have the right to liquidate the project if the entrepreneur defaults.   
Suppose the parties to agree that the entrepreneur will pay investors D in period 2 and 
that investors will otherwise have the right to liquidate the firm in period 2 and collect L.  
Under this contract, entrepreneurs never default strategically: they repay D in period 2 if 
the project succeeds and they default only if it fails.  Entrepreneurs prefer to repay in 
period 2 whenever they can, since they gain from retaining control and collecting  3 R in 
                                                 
20  Other models of default and workouts include Schwartz (1993) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991).            
21 This discussion draws on Hart and Moore (1998) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).  The financial 
contracting literature is concerned with the more general problem of determining the most efficient method 
of financing investment projects.   Debt contracts are shown to be efficient under fairly general 
assumptions, since they induce entrepreneurs to pay out some of their projects’ returns to investors, rather 
than always defaulting.       22 
period 3.  The contract does not call for the entrepreneur to pay anything to investors in 
period 3, since no obligation to pay is enforceable when the firm’s liquidation value is 
zero.     
        While the contract eliminates strategic default, it results in costly bankruptcy.  This 
is because investors liquidate all projects that default in period 2, but liquidation is 
always inefficient since it results in a loss of L R - 3 .   If instead investors allowed 
entrepreneurs to remain in control following default, then entrepreneurs would default 
even when their firms were successful.  Other possible contracts, such as investors 
playing mixed strategies, result in less bankruptcy but more strategic default (see Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1996).  But because of incomplete information, no contract can eliminate 
both bankruptcy and strategic default. 
       Several papers in the financial contracting literature consider alternative ways of 
reducing strategic default.  Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) extend their model to consider 
the optimal number of creditors and find that, when entrepreneurs borrow from multiple 
creditors, they are less likely to strategically default.  This is because strategic default 
only succeeds if none of the creditors liquidates the project and this outcome becomes 
less likely as the number of creditors increases.  Berglof and von Thadden (1994) 
consider a similar model in which the project has both short-term and long-term debt.  
Short-term and long-term debtholders have differing stakes in the project, since the latter 
benefit from its future earnings, while the former do not.  As a result, short-term 
debtholders are more likely to liquidate the project following default.  Berglof and von 
Thadden show that entrepreneurs are less likely to default strategically if the investors 
who hold the project’s short-term debt do not hold any of its long-term debt as well.  
Bester (1994) considers whether it is efficient for investors to lend on a secured rather 
than unsecured basis, where secured claims have the advantage that they reduce strategic 
default, but have the drawback of higher transactions costs.  Hart and Moore (1998) 
consider non-debt contracts.
22    
   
                                                 
22 See also Webb (1987).  An earlier literature, not discussed here, argued that amount of debt in firms’ 
capital structures is determined by a tradeoff between the tax advantage of using additional debt rather than 
equity versus the increase in expected bankruptcy costs as debt increases.  See, for example, Gordon and 
Malkiel (1981) and Bergman and Callen (1991)     23 
        Another issue that is important for corporate (as well as personal) bankruptcy is how 
bankruptcy law affects entrepreneurs’ effort levels.  Povel (1999) uses a financial 
contracting model to analyze the tradeoff between entrepreneurs’ effort levels and delay 
in filing for bankruptcy.  Suppose entrepreneurs borrow in period 0 to invest in a project 
and choose their effort levels in period 1.  Projects may turn out to be good, intermediate, 
or bad, where returns are highest for good projects, next highest for intermediate projects, 
and lowest for bad projects.  Higher effort by entrepreneurs raises the probability that 
projects turn out to be good or intermediate, rather than bad.  Higher effort is 
economically efficient, but it lowers entrepreneurs’ utility.  Investors are assumed unable 
to observe managers’ effort levels.   In period 2, the entrepreneur receives a signal 
concerning the project’s type, which investors do not observe.  If the signal is that the 
project’s type is bad, then it is efficient to liquidate it immediately.  If the signal is 
intermediate, then it is efficient for investors to rescue it by investing additional funds, 
where rescues convert projects with intermediate signals into projects equivalent to those 
that receive good signals.  After receiving the signal, entrepreneurs must choose between 
filing for bankruptcy versus continuing to operate the firm outside of bankruptcy.  Filing 
for bankruptcy reveals the signal to investors, while continuing outside of bankruptcy 
conceals it.  If entrepreneurs file for bankruptcy, then investors rescue projects that have 
intermediate signals and liquidate projects that have bad signals.  (Entrepreneurs do not 
file if their projects receive good signals.)  In period 3, if the project is still in existence, 
its true type is revealed and it earns a final return.  Entrepreneurs have an incentive to 
avoid filing for bankruptcy when their projects receive intermediate or bad signals, both 
because they benefit from remaining in control for longer and, since returns in period 3 
are uncertain, delay may solve the firm’s financial problems without investors’ 
intervention.  But delay is costly since rescues are only possible if they take place early.     
       Povel shows that the first best outcome is for entrepreneurs use high effort and to 
reveal information by filing for bankruptcy in period 2 whenever the signal is 
intermediate or bad.  But this outcome does not occur in equilibrium.  Povel analyzes the 
model under two different bankruptcy laws, which he refers to as “soft” versus “tough.”  
“Tough” bankruptcy law corresponds to Chapter 7 liquidation and, under it, 
entrepreneurs are fired whenever they file for bankruptcy in period 2.  “Soft” bankruptcy   24 
law corresponds to Chapter 11 reorganization.  Under it, if entrepreneurs file for 
bankruptcy in period 2, they remain in control when the project has an intermediate 
signal and creditors rescue it, while they receive a payoff when the project has a bad 
signal and creditors liquidate it.  Povel shows that, when bankruptcy law is soft, 
managers file for bankruptcy in period 2 whenever they receive intermediate or bad 
signals, since they are treated well.  But because they have a soft landing in bankruptcy, 
they use less effort.  In contrast when bankruptcy law is tough, managers never file for 
bankruptcy in period 2, since doing so costs them their jobs.  But then they have an 
incentive to use high effort in order to increase the probability that the project’s type will 
be good.  Thus neither “soft” versus “tough” bankruptcy law results in both efficient 
effort levels and early bankruptcy filings.  Depending on whether high managerial effort 
or early bankruptcy filings is more important, either type of bankruptcy law could be 
more economically efficient.
23     
      Berkovitch, Israel and Zender (1998) also analyze a model in which entrepreneurs 
make an effort-level decision that investors cannot observe and in which there is an early 
signal that the project’s quality is good, intermediate or bad.  But in their model, the 
signal is observed by both entrepreneurs and investors, so that there is no strategic default 
or delay in filing for bankruptcy.  If the signal is bad, then investors liquidate the project, 
which is efficient.   If the signal is intermediate, then the best outcome is for the project to 
continue operating without any additional investment.  However the loan contract must 
be renegotiated, since the entrepreneur would abandon the project if investors had to be 
repaid in full.  Berkovitch et al show that entrepreneurs choose an efficient level of effort 
if, when the signal is intermediate, investors receive the project’s liquidation value L if it 
liquidated immediately and the entrepreneur receives all of the project’s final period 
earnings net of its liquidation value.  This solution is efficient because it allows 
entrepreneurs to keep all of the marginal product of their extra effort.  The efficient 
outcome can be implemented by either of two bankruptcy reorganization procedures:  in 
the first, entrepreneurs and investors renegotiate their contracts and entrepreneurs are 
allowed to make take-it-or-leave it offers to investors; while in the second, the project is 
                                                 
23 Povel (1999) also considers which bankruptcy law the parties would prefer if they were allowed to 
choose when they write their contracts.     25 
auctioned, but the original investors are not allowed to bid.
24  Then in equilibrium, 
entrepreneurs either make an offer of L to investors in the renegotiation and investors 
accept or entrepreneurs win the auction by bidding L.  Thus the model suggests that in 
bankruptcy, either a renegotiation process (similar to the actual Chapter 11 procedure) or 
an auction process (similar to several bankruptcy reform proposals discussed below) can 
result in efficient outcomes.  But the authors do not consider whether the same result 
would occur if only the entrepreneur received the signal.
25  
    
     To summarize this section, theoretical models show that bankruptcy law affects 
managers’ incentive to use effort, to default strategically when the firm is not in financial 
distress, to conceal the firm’s financial distress from creditors, to file for bankruptcy too 
early or too late, and to choose inefficiently safe or risky investment projects.  The 
models consider both the effects on economic efficiency of changing the priority rules in 
bankruptcy and changing bankruptcy law in other ways—including making either 
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 the only bankruptcy procedure, substituting an auction process 
for the current negotiation process in Chapter 11, and compensating managers for 
liquidating projects that turn out badly.  But the models suggest that, except in special 
cases, no one bankruptcy procedure results in economically efficient outcomes along all 
the dimensions considered.   In the past, it was generally thought that using the APR to 
divide the assets of firms in bankruptcy led to economically efficient results.  However 
the models discussed here suggest that use of the APR does not prevent managers from 
behaving inefficiently by choosing excessively risky investment projects, delaying too 
long before filing for bankruptcy, and/or concealing information about the firm’s 
financial distress.   
        In the next section, I discuss the more law-oriented literature on bankruptcy reform.    
    
                                                 
24 The original investors are restricted from bidding because, unlike new investors, they have an incentive 
to bid more than L.   
25 Other issues that have been explored in the literature include how bankruptcy law affects managers’ 
incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital (see Berkovitch, Israel and Zender, 1997), whether it is 
efficient for creditors or debtors to have the right to initiate bankruptcy (see  Berkovitch and Israel, 1999), 
and how the bankruptcy law affects the efficiency of buyers’ and sellers’ incentives to breach contracts and 
to make reliance investments (see Triantis, 1993.)    
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B.  Proposed Reforms of Chapter 11—Auctions, Options, and Bankruptcy by 
Contract   
    A number of authors have argued for reforms of bankruptcy law.   Many of the 
proposed reforms are based on the assumption that using the APR to divide the assets of 
firms in bankruptcy is optimal and that the current Chapter 11 negotiation procedure--
which usually results in deviations from the APR--is sub-optimal.  The reform proposals 
advocate substituting various market-based methods of valuing the assets of firms in 
reorganization for the negotiation procedure of Chapter 11.  The justification for these 
proposals is that use of the market would result in more accurate valuations of bankrupt 
firms’ assets and, if valuations were more accurate, then the APR (without deviations) 
could be used to divide firms’ assets and efficiency would increase.    As an example of 
how inaccurate valuations lead to deviations from the APR, suppose the true value of a 
firm’s assets is $8 million and it has $8 million in high priority claims and $4 million in 
low priority claims.  If the firm is valued at $8 million or less, then high priority creditors 
receive 100% of the claims against the reorganized firm, while low priority creditors and 
old equityholders receive nothing.  But if the firm’s valuation instead is set at an inflated 
level of $14 million, then high priority creditors receive only $8 million/$14 million = 
57% of the claims against the reorganized firm, low priority creditors receive 29%, and 
equityholders receive 14%.   Thus accurate valuations allow the firm’s value to be 
divided according to the APR, while inflated valuations result in deviations from the 
APR.  Negotiations over reorganization plans in Chapter 11 frequently result in inflated 
valuations, because adoption of a reorganization plan by the voting procedure requires 
that low priority creditors and equityholders vote in favor, and they only do so if they 
receive some of the claims on the reorganized firm.  The reform proposals also abolish 
the voting procedure for adoption of reorganization plans in Chapter 11.  This would 
have the effect of separating the decision concerning how to divide the value of the firm’s 
assets from the decision concerning how to use the firm’s assets.   Some of the proposals 
also include new ways of determining how the reorganized firm’s assets would be used, 
while others assume that the market will decide.        27 
        But it should be noted that the theoretical models discussed above paint a more 
nuanced picture of the efficiency of deviations from the APR.  They cast some doubt on 
the idea that strict application of the APR in reorganization would increase efficiency.    
        
        1. Auctions.  One proposal is to auction all firms in bankruptcy.   If firms in Chapter 
11 are operating, then they would be auctioned as going concerns and, if they have shut 
down, then their assets would be auctioned piecemeal.  The proceeds of the auction 
would be distributed to creditors and equity according to the APR.  This proposal would 
eliminate the distinction between reorganization and liquidation in bankruptcy.  Under it, 
the winner of the auction--rather than the firm’s old managers--would make the choice 
between shutting down the firm versus reorganizing it.  This would increase efficiency 
since, while managers invariably favor reorganization over liquidation, buyers have their 
own money at stake and have an incentive to make value-maximizing decisions.   Under 
the auction proposal, it is likely that fewer financially distressed firms would be saved 
and more would liquidate, i.e., there would be less filtering failure. An advantage of the 
auction proposal, along with similar market-based proposals, is that the reorganization 
process would be much quicker, since there would be no need to negotiate reorganization 
plans and have them  approved.
 26    
      Roe (1983) proposed a variant on the auction idea for firms in Chapter 11 that are 
large enough to have publicly-traded equity.  Under his proposal, reorganized firms 
would have all-equity capital structures and a small fraction of the reorganized firm’s 
shares would be sold on the market during the reorganization process.  The sale price of 
these shares would provide an objective basis for valuing the entire firm and this 
valuation would be used to divide the reorganized firm’s value  according to the APR.  
The same procedure could be used if the reorganized firm has debt in its capital structure, 
as long as the value of the debt is clear and the total amount of debt is low enough that 
the reorganized firm’s shares would trade at a positive price.  But Roe argues that debt 
should be limited in order to ensure the reorganized firm’s financial viability.  Roe does 
                                                 
26 See Baird (1986), (1987) and (1993) and Jackson (1986) for discussion.  Note that all of the reform 
proposals discussed here would require new bankruptcy legislation to be passed.   For example, under 
current law it is difficult to auction firms that have filed under Chapter 11, since equityholders generally 
receive nothing in an auction and they can stop it from occurring by registering objections with the 
bankruptcy court.     28 
not specify a method for determining how the firm’s assets would be used after 
reorganization.   Presumably a buyer would eventually take control of the reorganized 
firm by purchasing a controlling interest in its shares.   
      Roe notes another problem with his procedure, which is that old equity and/or junior 
creditors may have an incentive to artificially bid up the price of the new shares, since a 
higher valuation increases their payoff.  Suppose the reorganized firm has 10,000 shares, 
of which 1,000 are sold during reorganization for $100 each, so that the firm’s total value 
is set at $1 million.  Also suppose senior and junior debt have face values of $1.5 million 
and $500,000, respectively.  Then junior creditors have an incentive to bid up the price of 
the new shares, since they receive nothing in reorganization unless the reorganized firm’s 
value exceeds $1.5 million.   Suppose they  bid up the price of the new shares to $200 
each.  Then the reorganized firm’s value would be set at $2 million and junior creditors 
would receive $500,000/2,000,000 = 25% of the shares.  Since the firm’s true value is $1 
million, these shares would actually be worth $250,000.  Temporarily bidding up the 
value of the new shares from $100 to $200 would be worthwhile to junior creditors if it 
cost less than this amount.  Given the small number of shares sold during reorganization, 
manipulating the market might be relatively inexpensive and therefore worthwhile.      
      Other potential problems with bankruptcy auctions have also been noted.  One 
problem is that, if few bankrupt firms are auctioned, then buyers may assume that they 
are lemons and respond with low bids.  This problem would disappear if all firms in 
bankruptcy were auctioned.  Another problem is that initial public offerings are 
expensive and risky, so that they may not be worthwhile for many firms in bankruptcy.  
A third problem is that bidders for a bankrupt firm are likely to be other firms in the same 
industry.  But the financial condition of firms in particular industries tends to be 
positively correlated.  This means that if one firm in an industry is bankrupt, then other 
firms in the industry are likely to be in financial difficulties as well and, therefore, their 
bids will be low.  The result may be that the winning bidder is a firm in another industry, 
even though the buyer that can make the best use of the firm’s assets is another firm in 
the same industry.  Or it may mean that the best use of the firm’s assets is for the old 
manager and creditors to remain in control, i.e., for the firm to be reorganized.
27    
                                                 
27 See also Baird (1993),  Shleifer and Vishny (1992), and Berkovitch, Israel and Zender (1997) and (1998).     29 
Finally, quick auctions of bankrupt firms may force bidders to make their bids when they 
are very uncertain about the firm’s value.  Thus while quick auctions save on bankruptcy 
costs, they may result in lower bids.  An alternative would be to delay holding auctions 
while the bankruptcy trustee or an interim manager generates additional information 
about the bankrupt firm’s true financial situation.
28   
        
        2. Options.   Bebchuk (1988) and (2000) proposed using options rather than auctions 
to value the assets of firms in bankruptcy.  His proposal allows creditors and 
equityholders to be compensated according to the APR even though the value of the 
reorganized firm’s assets is uncertain.  To illustrate, suppose a bankrupt firm has 100 
senior creditors who are each owed $1, 100 junior creditors who are each owed $1, and 
100 shares of equity.  Also suppose the reorganized firm will have 100 shares of equity.  
Under the options approach, each junior creditor is given an option to purchase the 
interests of a senior creditor for $1 and each equityholder is given an option to purchase 
the interests of a junior creditor for $2.  All options must be exercised at a particular date.  
One possibility is that neither the junior creditors nor the equityholders exercise their 
options, which means that shares are worth less than $1.  Then each senior creditor ends 
up with 1 share of the reorganized firm worth less than $1 and junior creditors and equity 
receive nothing.  Another possibility is that junior creditors exercise their options, but 
equityholders do not.  This means that shares are worth between $1 and $2 each.  Each 
senior creditor then ends up with $1, each junior creditor ends up with 1 share of the 
reorganized firm minus $1, for a net value of less than $1, and equityholders receive 
nothing.  The final possibility is that both junior creditors and equityholders exercise their 
options, so that shares are worth more than $2 each.  Then each senior and junior creditor 
ends up with $1 and each equityholder ends up with one share of the reorganized firm 
minus $2.  Regardless of whether the options are exercised, the APR is always followed, 
since each creditor either ends up with full payment ($1) or else ends up owning a share 
of the reorganized firm worth less than $1 and lowering ranking claims receive nothing.  
Similarly, equityholders either pay $2 for a share of the reorganized firm worth more than 
$2 or else they receive nothing.  A market for the options would operate before the 
                                                 
28 See Gertner and Picker (1992).   30 
exercise date, so that junior creditors and equityholders would have a choice between 
exercising their options if they think that doing so is worthwhile or selling their options if 
they are liquidity-constrained or do not think that exercising them is worthwhile.   An 
important difference between the options proposal and other market-based proposals is 
that the reorganized firm ends up with debt in its capital structure, although some of the 
old debt is converted to equity.  
      In Bebchuk’s proposal, there is no explicit method for determining whether the old 
managers will be replaced and how the reorganized firm’s assets will be used.  After the 
options are exercised, the new equityholders would elect a board of directors that would 
hire a manager—the same procedure as is followed by non-bankrupt firms.  Aghion, 
Hart, and Moore (1992) extended Bebchuk’s options scheme to include a vote by the new 
equityholders on how the reorganized firm’s assets will be used.  Under their proposal, 
the bankruptcy judge solicits bids that could involve either cash or non-cash offers for the 
reorganized firm’s new equity or simply offers to manage the firm with the new 
equityholders retaining their shares.  The bids would be announced at the same time that 
the options are issued, so that the parties could use the information contained in the bids 
when they decide whether to exercise their options.  After the options are exercised, the 
new equityholders would vote on the bids and the one receiving the most votes would be 
selected.   Both Bebchuk (2000) and Aghion et al (1992) argue that an advantage of the 
options process is its speed—firms would exit bankruptcy within a few months after 
filing.
29    
 
    3.  Contracting about bankruptcy.    Bankruptcy is a mandatory procedure in the sense 
that, when firms become insolvent, the state-supplied bankruptcy procedure must be used 
to resolve creditors’ claims.  Debtors and creditors are not allowed to contract for any 
alternative dispute-resolution procedure or for any limits on debtors’ right to file for 
bankruptcy and to choose between Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11.  They also cannot 
contract out of use of the APR in Chapter 7.  In this sense, bankruptcy differs from other 
                                                 
29 However disputes over the priority of particular creditors’ claims could delay the process.  See also Hart 
et al (1997) for a proposal that combines options and auctions.       
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aspects of commercial law, where the law provides a set of default rules, but the parties 
are generally allowed to contract out of the default rules by agreeing on alternative 
arrangements.  Schwartz (1997) argued that efficiency would be enhanced if creditors 
and debtors could choose some of the characteristics of their bankruptcy procedure when 
they negotiate their debt contracts.
30   The argument that allowing parties to choose their 
own bankruptcy procedure could enhance efficiency makes sense in light of the models 
of Povel (1999) and Berkovitch et al (1998), discussed above, which show that the 
optimal bankruptcy procedure varies depending on exogenous characteristics of the 
parties or the legal environment.   This suggests that allowing debtors and creditors to 
contract over the bankruptcy procedure could potentially improve efficiency.       
      Schwartz first examines a model in which the bankruptcy procedure is mandatory.  
As under current bankruptcy law, he assumes that there are separate liquidation and 
reorganization procedures and debtors have the right to choose between them.  Firms in 
financial distress are divided into two types: type 1’s that have higher value if they 
reorganize and type 2’s that have higher value if they liquidate.  Schwartz assumes that 
debtors prefer reorganization over liquidation even when their firms are type 2, because 
reorganization allows them to remain in control and take perks for longer.  Therefore 
under the mandatory bankruptcy regime, some or all type 2 firms reorganize when it 
would be more efficient for them to liquidate, i.e., filtering failure occurs.  Filtering 
failure in bankruptcy reduces creditors’ return, thereby raising interest rates and reducing 
the level of investment.       
     Schwartz then examines whether filtering failure might be reduced if debtors and 
creditors were allowed to contract over certain aspects of bankruptcy.  In the contracting 
regime, he assumes that separate liquidation and reorganization procedures still remain in 
effect and debtors still have the right to choose between them (the same as under 
mandatory bankruptcy).  But now creditors and debtors are allowed to contract in 
advance for creditors to pay the debtor a pre-determined fraction of the firm’s liquidation 
value if the debtor chooses liquidation rather than reorganization in bankruptcy.  Thus 
while the mandatory bankruptcy regime uses the APR when liquidation occurs, debtors 
                                                 
30 See Rasmussen (1992) for a similar argument that the parties should be allowed to choose their 
bankruptcy procedure at the time they adopt a corporate charter.     32 
and creditors are allowed to contract for deviations from the APR when liquidation 
occurs.  Schwartz shows that a bribe of this type can result in efficient bankruptcy 
filtering, i.e., managers of type 2 firms always choose liquidation and managers of type 1 
firms always choose reorganization.  This is because when managers of type 2 firms are 
rewarded rather than penalized for choosing liquidation, they are more likely to do so.  
(But the reward cannot be too high, or else managers of type 1 firms would also choose 
liquidation.)   Schwartz also considers contracts that involve debtors and creditors 
agreeing to renegotiate when the firm is in financial distress and shows that these 
contracts can also lead to efficient bankruptcy filtering.  Thus a variety of possible 
bankruptcy contracts leads to more efficient outcomes than the current mandatory 
bankruptcy regime.     
      Schwartz’ results suggest that allowing debtors and creditors to contract about the 
bankruptcy process in theory could improve economic efficiency.   However his model 
only begins to probe the issue, since it ignores important issues such as asymmetric 
information, strategic default, and conflicts of interest among creditors.  In addition, 
bankruptcy contracting may harm certain types of creditors—such as tort and tax 
claimants and trade creditors—that do not have contracts with the firm.  This is because 
debtors and contracting creditors have an incentive to agree on a bankruptcy process that 
diverts value from non-contracting creditors.  This topic seems ripe for further research.
31     
 
       4.  Contracts as substitutes for bankruptcy.  Adler (1993) suggested an approach to 
contracting about bankruptcy that involves completely abolishing bankruptcy.  Under his 
approach, called “chameleon equity,” insolvent firms would not file for bankruptcy.  
Instead some of their debts would be converted to equity, starting with the lowest priority 
claims.    The new equity would replace old equity—thus preserving the APR.  Enough 
debt would be converted to equity to restore the firm to solvency.   Debt contracts would 
no longer give creditors the right to sue firms for repayment following default or to force 
defaulting firms into bankruptcy.  Instead, they would contain procedures for converting 
debt into equity in the event of insolvency.  As an example, suppose a firm’s assets are 
worth $1,000,000, but it is insolvent because it has $1,000,000 in senior debt and 
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$500,000 in junior debt.  Then the junior debt would be converted to equity and the 
firm’s old equity would be eliminated.  These changes would restore the firm to solvency.     
       The proposal has a number of problems.  An important one is that Adler assumes 
complete information, so that creditors and equity always agree on the firm’s value.  If 
the parties disagreed on the firm’s value or the firm’s value were unknown, then it would 
not be clear whether the firm is insolvent and the debt conversion procedure should go 
into effect.  Another problem is that if information were asymmetric, then managers 
would have a strong incentive to default strategically, i.e., to claim insolvency even when 
the firm’s financial condition is good, since doing so allows them to avoid repaying the 
firm’s debt.  The lack of a penalty for default would undermine credit markets and greatly 
reduce credit availability.   In addition, there would be a high level of filtering failure, 
since failing firms would continue to operate as long as their revenues covered variable 
costs, even if their assets were more valuable in some other use.        
 
III.  Research on Corporate Bankruptcy—Empirical Work 
        For reasons of data availability, most empirical research on corporate bankruptcy in 
the U.S. focuses on large corporations that have publicly traded debt or equity.  This 
means that the studies all have small samples, since relative few large corporations file 
for bankruptcy.  Also large corporations generally file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, 
so that the available information about corporate bankruptcy is mainly for firms in 
Chapter 11.  When large corporations liquidate in bankruptcy under Chapter 7, it is 
generally after a prolonged period of operating in Chapter 11 and failing to adopt a 
reorganization plan.  This means that we know little about what would happen if large 
corporations filed under Chapter 7 and liquidated without first spending time in Chapter 
11.  It also means that comparisons of payoff rates to creditors of large corporations 
under Chapter 11 versus Chapter 7 are biased upward.
32   
        Empirical research has concentrated on measuring the costs of bankruptcy and the 
size and frequency of deviations from the APR.  More recent papers also examine how 
out-of-bankruptcy workouts and prepacks differ from normal Chapter 11 filings.  In both 
                                                 
32 For an empirical study of small firms in bankruptcy, see LoPucki (1983).  
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workouts and prepacks, negotiations over a plan to restructure debt occur outside of 
bankruptcy.  Depending on the outcome of the negotiations, the firm may file under 
Chapter 11 with a reorganization plan already agreed on or a restructuring plan might go 
into effect without a bankruptcy filing.
33         
 
A.  Bankruptcy costs 
        An ideal measure of the costs of bankruptcy would cover both direct and indirect 
costs.  Direct costs include the legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy, while 
indirect costs include all the costs of bankruptcy-induced disruptions, including asset 
disappearance, loss of key employees, and investment opportunities foregone because 
managers’ time is spent on the bankruptcy.  Most studies measure only the direct costs of 
bankruptcy, because bankrupt corporations must report these costs to the bankruptcy 
court.  Weiss’ (1990) study of 37 corporate bankruptcies during the early 1980’s found 
that the direct costs of bankruptcy averaged 3.1% of the combined value of debt plus 
equity.  Other studies by have found similar results (see Ang et al, 1982).   
        Indirect bankruptcy costs are more difficult to measure, but are likely to be much 
greater than direct bankruptcy costs.  White (1983) solved for upper bound expressions 
on indirect bankruptcy costs, using a coalition model of the bankruptcy decision.  Her 
results suggest that the indirect costs of bankruptcy may be as high as twenty times the 
direct costs of bankruptcy.   
        Other studies provide indirect evidence suggesting that bankruptcy is very 
disruptive.  Gilson (1990) and Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) found that the turnover 
rates of top executives and directors were much higher for large corporations in Chapter 
11 than for those not in bankruptcy.  Carapeto (2000) found that when a large corporation 
in Chapter 11 offers multiple reorganization plans to creditors, the total amount offered 
declines by 14% between the first and the last plan.  This implies that the marginal costs 
of remaining in bankruptcy longer increase quickly.  Hotchkiss (1995) found that filing 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 and adopting a reorganization plan does not necessarily 
solve the financial problems of distressed corporations, since one-third of her sample of 
firms that successfully reorganized required further restructuring within a few years.   Her 
                                                 
33 See the discussion of workouts and prepacks in section IC above.        35 
results are consistent with a model in which some inefficient firms reorganize even 
though they should liquidate, but are also consistent with models in which reorganized 
firms fail simply because they have too much debt in their capital structures.     
 
B.  Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule. 
     A number of studies have estimated the frequency and size of deviations from the 
APR.  Following Franks and Torous (1989), these studies classify reorganization plans as 
involving deviations from the APR if equity receives more than it would under the APR 
and they measure the size of deviations from the APR by the amount paid to equity in 
violation of the APR divided by the total amount distributed under the reorganization 
plan.  For example if a firm owes $1,000,000 to creditors, then deviations from the APR 
occur if equity receives anything when creditors receive less than $1,000,000.  Assuming 
that the reorganization plan calls for creditors to receive $500,000 and equity to receive 
shares in the reorganized firm having a value of $50,000, then deviations from the APR 
amount to $50,000/500,000 or 10%.
34   
      Weiss (1990) examined a sample of 38 corporations that filed for bankruptcy.  Of 
these, 31 adopted reorganization plans, of which 28 involved deviations from the APR. 
(The remaining seven corporations in his sample liquidated, including one that liquidated 
in Chapter 11.)  Eberhart et al (1990) found deviations from the APR in 23 of 30 
reorganization plans they studied and Betker (1995) found deviations in 54 of 75 
reorganization plans.
35  Carapeto (2000) found similar results using a more recent sample 
of firms in Chapter 11.   Thus about three-quarters of Chapter 11 reorganization plans 
involve deviations from the APR.  Turning to the size of deviations from the APR, 
Eberhart et al (1990) found that the average deviation from the APR in their sample was 
7.5%, with a range from 0 to 36%; while Betker (1995) found an average deviation of 
2.9%.   
                                                 
34 This ignores the fact that payments to creditors under the plan are usually made over six years, so that 
additional deviations from the APR occur because payments are delayed and because the reorganized firm 
may later default.  It also ignores deviations from the APR that involve payments to lower-priority creditors 
when higher-priority creditors are not repaid in full.     
35 See also LoPucki and Whitford (1990).  These studies all involve samples of corporations that filed under 
Chapter 11 during the 1980’s and there is considerable overlap.     36 
        How do deviations from the APR relate to the financial condition of corporations in 
Chapter 11?   This relationship can be estimated by regressing the amount paid to equity 
as a fraction of unsecured creditors’ claims on the amount paid to unsecured creditors as 
a fraction of their claims (i.e., the payoff rate to unsecured creditors).    If the APR were 
always followed, the estimated coefficient of the payoff rate to unsecured creditors would 
be zero whenever creditors’ payoff rate  is less than 100%, but would become infinite 
whenever creditors’ payoff rate exceeds 100%.  Deviations from the APR are predicted to 
make this relationship positive even when creditors’ payoff rate is low.  But the 
coefficient of the payoff rate to unsecured creditors is predicted to rise as creditors’ 
payoff rate approaches 100%.        
      White (1989) estimated this relationship, using data from the studies by LoPucki and 
Whitford (1990) and Eberhart et al (1990).  The results showed a smooth relationship 
with a gradually increasing slope.  In particular equity receives a minimum payoff of 
about 5 percent of creditors’ claims, regardless of how little creditors receive.  When 
unsecured creditors’ payoff rate is around 50%---a common figure---equity receives 
about 15% of creditors’ claims and, when unsecured creditors’ payoff rate reaches 90%, 
equity receives about 40% of creditors’ claims.  These results are consistent with a 
bargaining model of Chapter 11 such as Bebchuk and Chang (1992), in which equity gets 
a low payoff in return for giving up its right to delay adoption of the reorganization plan 
and gets more as equity’s option on the firm comes closer to being in the money.  Betker 
(1995) finds similar results.  He also finds that deviations from the APR are smaller when 
a higher proportion of the firm’s debt is secured.   
         Finally, several studies examine the frequency of out-of-bankruptcy workouts and 
compare them to Chapter 11 reorganization plans.  Gilson et al (1990) examined 169 
large corporations that defaulted on their debt during the 1980s and found that 47% 
negotiated restructuring agreements that allowed them to avoid bankruptcy, while of the 
remainder, at least 70% attempted to restructure outside of bankruptcy, but failed and 
filed under Chapter 11.  Thus about 85% of firms in their sample attempted to negotiate 
workouts, suggesting that workouts are the preferred procedure for corporations dealing 
with financial distress.  However the percent of firms that succeeded in negotiating 
workouts outside of bankruptcy—47%--is much smaller than the percent of firms that   37 
succeeded in negotiating reorganization plans in bankruptcy—29/38 or 76% in Weiss’ 
(1990) study.  This suggests that strategic default is an important problem in workouts, 
i.e., creditors reject workouts because they believe that many firms are not truly in 
financial distress.  Tashjian et al (1996) compared deviations from the APR in workouts 
versus Chapter 11 bankruptcies and found that workouts were associated with smaller 
deviations from the APR, i.e., creditors did better in workouts than in Chapter 11.  This 
result also suggests that shareholders are in a much bargaining position in workout 
negotiations than in Chapter 11 negotiations.




Part Two: Personal Bankruptcy 
 
 
Like corporate bankruptcy procedures, personal bankruptcy procedures determine 
both the total amount that debtors must repay their creditors--the size of the pie--and how 
repayment is shared among individual creditors--the division of the pie.  A larger pie 
benefits all individuals who borrow, because higher repayment causes creditors to lend 
more at lower interest rates.  But a larger pie requires that debtors use more of their post-
bankruptcy earnings to repay pre-bankruptcy debt, which reduces their incentive to work.  
A larger pie also affects whether debtors consume versus invest their wealth and whether 
they choose safe or risky investments.  The division of the pie also has efficiency 
implications, because it affects whether creditors race against each other to be first to 
collect and how aggressively they pursue collection efforts.  We discussed above how the 
race to be first to collect from corporate debtors has been replaced by a race to leapfrog 
over other creditors in the priority ordering.  But in the consumer debt context, debts do 
not tend to be individually negotiated, so that creditors have a stronger incentive to race 
to be first.  The race to be first can harm debtors, since they may stop working or lose 
their jobs if creditors repossess their cars or institute wage garnishment.       
Despite these similarities, there are important differences between personal and 
corporate bankruptcy.   One difference is that, while corporations in bankruptcy may 
either shut down/liquidate or continue to operate/reorganize, individual debtors in 
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bankruptcy always reorganize.  This is because an important part of individual debtors’ 
assets is their human capital, which can only be liquidated by selling debtors into slavery.  
Since slavery is no longer used as a penalty for bankruptcy, all personal bankruptcy 
procedures are forms of reorganization.
37  Individual debtors keep their human capital 
and the right to use it and they keep some or all of their financial assets.  Depending on 
the bankruptcy procedure, they may be obliged to use some of their wealth and/or some 
of their future earnings to repay debt.  These features also characterize corporate 
reorganization under Chapter 11.  Because there is no liquidation in personal bankruptcy, 
there is no “filtering failure,”  i.e., no deadweight costs occur as a result of individual 
debtors reorganizing in bankruptcy when they should liquidate or vice versa.
38 
Another difference between personal versus corporate bankruptcy is the insurance 
objective of personal bankruptcy.  Individual debtors may suffer long-term harm if their 
consumption falls so much that they become homeless or their illnesses become 
disabilities for lack of medical care.   Also, individual debtors’ financial distress can have 
negative external effects on their family members, since sharp falls in consumption may 
cause debtors’ children to drop out of school prematurely in order to work or may result 
in family members’ illnesses going untreated.  Personal bankruptcy reduces the 
probability of financial distress causing long-term harm to debtors or their family 
members by providing partial consumption insurance.  It does this by discharging debt 
when debtors’ wealth or earnings turn out to be low and they file for bankruptcy.  The 
insurance objective of personal bankruptcy has no counterpart in corporate bankruptcy.
39   
 
As a result of these fundamental differences between personal and corporate 
bankruptcy, personal bankruptcy has exemptions that allow individual debtors to keep 
some of both their financial assets and their future earnings in bankruptcy, regardless of 
how much they owe.  Higher exemptions for financial assets and future earnings benefit 
                                                 
37 Both the US and Britain also used debtors’ prison in the past as a penalty for bankruptcy.  Putting debtors 
into prison can be thought of as forcing them to bargain a repayment plan with creditors, but from a very 
unfavorable initial position.   
38 Nonetheless, one of the two U.S. personal bankruptcy procedures is called liquidation.  See the 
discussion below.  
39 Rea (1984) was the first to point out the insurance aspect of personal bankruptcy.   Jackson (1986) argued 
that post-bankruptcy wages should be more fully exempt than financial wealth in personal bankruptcy, 
because of debtors’ inability to diversify their human capital.   See also Hynes (2002).       39 
debtors and their family members by increasing their consumption when it would 
otherwise be very low.  Higher exemptions for future earnings also increase efficiency by 
giving debtors stronger incentives to work/use their human capital after bankruptcy.  But 
higher exemptions reduce the size of the pie, which makes borrowing less attractive to 
debtors.  In contrast, there are no exemptions for corporations that liquidate in 
bankruptcy.  However when corporations reorganize in bankruptcy, they keep their assets 
and repay creditors from their future earnings.  “Deviations from the APR” are the 
corporate equivalent of personal bankruptcy exemptions, since they reduce the amount 
that debtors repay to creditors—i.e., they reduce the size of the pie.   
  This part of the chapter contains separate sections that discuss personal bankruptcy 
law, statistics on personal bankruptcy filings, theoretical research on personal 
bankruptcy, and empirical evidence concerning personal bankruptcy.    
 
 
II.  Legal Background  --  Personal Bankruptcy Law 
 
       The U.S. has two main personal bankruptcy procedures:  Chapter 7—called  
“liquidation”--and Chapter 13—formally called  “adjustment of debts of consumers with 
regular income.”
40   I first discuss creditors’ legal remedies outside of bankruptcy, then 
discuss Chapters 7 and 13, and finally discuss the main provisions of the recent (2005) 
bankruptcy reform.       
 
A.   Creditors’ Legal Remedies  Outside of Bankruptcy 
 
      When individual debtors default on their debt obligations but do not file for 
bankruptcy, creditors usually send letters and telephone, reminding debtors of the 
overdue debt and threatening to harm their credit ratings if they fail to repay.  Creditors 
also add late charges and interest.  Creditors’ next step is to sue the debtor.  On winning 
(usually by default), they can obtain a court order to garnish debtors’ wages.  Under the 
Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 75% of wages or 30 times the federal minimum 
wage per week, whichever is higher, is exempt from garnishment.  A few states restrict 
garnishment more tightly, or ban it completely.  Because the total amount that can be 
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garnished is limited, creditors have an incentive to race to be first to garnish debtors’ 
wages.  However debtors often file for bankruptcy when their wages are garnished, since 
a bankruptcy filing terminates garnishment.
41 
        Creditors can also seize debtors’ bank accounts and/or foreclose on their houses, but 
they rarely do so.  This is because each state has a set of exemptions for particular types 
of financial assets and the debtor receives up to the value of the exemption before the 
creditor receives anything.  For example, suppose a debtor owes $10,000 on a credit card.  
The debtor also owns a house worth $100,000 that has a mortgage of $75,000 and the 
“homestead” exemption in the debtor’s state covers home equity of $25,000 or more.  
Then foreclosing is not worthwhile for the credit card lender, since the mortgage lender 
receives the first $75,000 of the sale proceeds and the exemption covers the rest.              
      
B.   Chapter 7 “Liquidation”  
 
Although I argued above that all personal bankruptcy procedures are forms of 
reorganization, nonetheless one of the two U.S. personal bankruptcy procedures is called 
liquidation.  When an individual or married couple files for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, 
the formal procedure is very similar to the corporate Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure.  
Wage garnishment and other collection efforts by creditors terminate.  Most unsecured 
debts--including credit card debt, installment loans, medical debt, unpaid rent and utility 
bills, tort judgments, and business debt if the debtor owns an unincorporated business--
are discharged.  (Other types of debt, including secured loans, student loans, child 
support obligations, and debts incurred by fraud, cannot be discharged in Chapter 7.)   All 
of the debtor’s future earnings and some of the debtor’s financial assets are exempt from 
the obligation to repay—the 100% exemption for future earnings is referred to as the 
“fresh start.”   The bankruptcy court appoints a trustee to find and liquidate all of the 
debtor’s non-exempt financial assets and the absolute priority rule (APR)—discussed 
above--is used to divide the proceeds among creditors.  Highest priority under the APR 
                                                 
41 A few states have higher garnishment exemptions or ban garnishment completely.  See White (1998a) for 
discussion and a state-by-state list of exemptions and limits on garnishment.   The Consumer Credit 
Protection Act also restricts collection practices in other ways, such as limiting the hours during which 
creditors can call and preventing employers from firing workers the first time a creditor garnishes their 
wages.   41 
goes to the administrative expenses of the bankruptcy process itself; followed by priority 
claims (mainly taxes); followed by unsecured creditors’ claims.  Claims in each class are 
paid in full until funds are exhausted.  
      Secured creditors—mainly mortgage creditors who have liens on debtors’ houses and 
automobile creditors who have liens on debtors’ cars--are outside the priority ordering.  
In Chapter 7, the debtor has a choice between continuing payments on secured loans and 
retaining the collateral versus defaulting and giving up the collateral.  If the debtor gives 
up the collateral and the bankruptcy trustee sells it, then the difference between the sale 
proceeds and the face value of the loan becomes an unsecured debt.    
       Thus under Chapter 7, the size of the pie—the pool of assets that debtors must use to 
repay creditors--is smaller for individual debtors than for corporations.  This is because 
individual debtors benefit from the “fresh start” and the exemptions for financial assets, 
while exemptions for corporations in Chapter 7 are zero.  Higher exemptions reduce 
individual debtors’ obligation to repay and increase their minimum consumption levels, 
since they allow debtors to keep more of their financial assets (although higher 
exemptions have no effect on debtors’ consumption if their assets are below the 
exemption levels).  The responsibility to set exemption levels is split between the Federal 
government and the states.  Federal law mandates the “fresh start” in Chapter 7, so that it 
applies all over the U.S.
 42   There is also a set of Federal bankruptcy exemptions for 
various types of wealth.  However in 1978, Congress gave the states the right to opt out 
of the Federal wealth exemptions by adopting their own, so that wealth exemptions vary 
across states.  States’ wealth exemptions apply both in and outside of bankruptcy, while 
the Federal wealth exemptions apply only in bankruptcy.   States generally have separate 
exemptions for equity in owner-occupied homes (“homestead” exemptions), clothing and 
furniture, “tools of the trade,” automobiles, retirement accounts, and other assets.  
Homestead exemptions in particular vary widely, from zero in the District of Columbia to 
unlimited in Texas, Florida and five other states.  Because debtors can easily convert non-
                                                 
42 Other countries do not generally apply the fresh start in bankruptcy.  For example, in Germany, 
individual debtors are not allowed to file for bankruptcy voluntarily and their debts are not discharged in 
bankruptcy, although creditors’ efforts to collect are stayed.  Debtors are required to repay from future 
earnings.   See Alexopoulos and Domowitz (1998) for discussion.   Note that in the U.S., not all debt is 
discharged in bankruptcy, so that in practice debtors receive only a partial fresh start.      42 
exempt assets such as bank accounts into home equity before filing for bankruptcy, high 
homestead exemptions protect all types of wealth for debtors who are homeowners.
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       Debtors can file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 no more than once every six years.   
This means that the right to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 has an option value, since 
filing in the future may be more valuable than filing immediately.     
     
C.  Chapter 13 “Adjustment of Debts of Consumers with Regular Income.”       
Individual debtors have the right to choose between Chapter 7 versus Chapter 13 
when they file for bankruptcy.  Under Chapter 13, they keep all of their financial assets, 
but they must propose a plan to repay part of their debt from future earnings over three to 
five years.  The debtor proposes the schedule of payments—called a repayment plan.  
The plan must give creditors as much as they would have received under Chapter 7, but 
no more.  (This is called the “best interest of creditors” test.)
44   If and when the debtor 
completes most or all of the payments under the plan, then the remaining debt is 
discharged.  Unlike Chapter 11 for corporations, only the bankruptcy judge must approve 
repayment plans; creditors do not have the right to vote on repayment plans.      
      The “best interest of creditors” test implies that the size of the pie must be at least as 
large in Chapter 13 as in Chapter 7.  Also because the test applies individually to all 
creditors, each slice of the pie must be at least as large in Chapter 13 as in Chapter 7.       
But because debtors are generally obliged to repay little or nothing in Chapter 7, 
repayment in Chapter 13 is also low, because most debtors would prefer to file under 
Chapter 7 if they had to repay more in Chapter 13.  As a result, debtors in Chapter 13 
often propose token repayment plans in which they promise to repay only 1% of their 
                                                 
43 About one-third of the states allow their debtors to choose between their states’ wealth exemptions and 
the Federal exemptions when they file for bankruptcy.   See Lin and White (2001) for a list of wealth 
exemptions by state.   
44 An additional requirement for discharge of debt in Chapter 7, adopted by Congress in 1984, is that the 
bankruptcy petition not constitute “substantial abuse” of the Bankruptcy Code.  In theory this requirement 
could cause debtors with relatively high wealth or earnings to file under Chapter 13 and to repay more than 
they would under Chapter 7, because they would fail the “substantial abuse” test  if they filed under 
Chapter 7.  But courts have generally held that ability to repay debt does not by itself constitute “substantial 
abuse” of Chapter 7.   Another requirement for approving a Chapter 13 repayment plan, also adopted in 
1984, is that if creditors object to the proposed repayment plan, then debtors must use all of their “projected 
disposable income” for three years to repay.  This requirement has also been ineffective, in part because it 
is difficult for judges to determine what income is or should be disposable, since high-earning debtors 
normally have high expenses.   See White (1998b) and Hynes (2002) for discussion.         43 
debts, and bankruptcy judges accept these plans since debtors would otherwise shift to 
Chapter 7.
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        Chapter 13 has various special features that make it attractive to debtors in particular 
circumstances.  Some types of debts--such as those incurred by fraud--can be discharged 
only in Chapter 13.  Also debtors often file under Chapter 13 if they have fallen behind 
on their mortgage or car payments and wish to delay foreclosure while they make up the 
arrears.   If the secured debt is a car loan, then filing under Chapter 13 is beneficial for 
debtors because the principle amount of the loan is reduced to the current market value of 
the car.  Finally, debtors sometimes file under Chapter 13 because they have filed under 
Chapter 7 within the past six years and are therefore ineligible to file again.   Debtors can 
file under Chapter 13 as frequently as every six months.   
      Overall, the bankruptcy exemptions and the relationship between Chapters 7 and 13 
imply that there is a basic mismatch in U.S. personal bankruptcy law between individual 
debtors’ ability to repay and their obligation to repay once they file for bankruptcy.  
Creditors lend to individual debtors based on their ability to repay, which increases with 
both financial assets and future earnings, and, outside of bankruptcy, debtors are obliged 
to use both types of assets to repay.  But once debtors file for bankruptcy under Chapter 
7, their future earnings are completely exempt and some or all of their financial assets are 
also exempt.  Even if debtors have appreciable financial wealth, they can often protect it 
in bankruptcy by converting it from a non-exempt form to an exempt form before filing.  
As a result, most individual debtors repay little in bankruptcy even when their ability to 
repay is high.   
      The Chapter 11 corporate reorganization procedure is similar to Chapter 13 in that 
corporate managers have the right to choose which Chapter they file under and corporate 
reorganization plans must only repay creditors in reorganization the amount that they 
would receive in liquidation.  But the degree of the mismatch is greatly reduced for 
corporations, because corporations have no exemptions in Chapter 7 bankruptcy and no 
“fresh start.”  Corporate creditors also have the right to approve the firm’s reorganization 
                                                 
45 Note that administration of Chapter 13 varies across bankruptcy judges.  Some judges require debtors to 
repay more than would be required in Chapter 7 and others force many debtors to file under Chapter 13 
even if they would benefit more under Chapter 7.  Debtors who file under Chapter 13 often fail to complete 
their repayment plans.  See Braucher (1993) for discussion and references.           44 
plan.  As a result, corporations in Chapter 11 generally repay a much higher fraction of 
their debts than do individual in Chapter 13.  
 
D.  The New Bankruptcy Law. 
 A new bankruptcy law was adopted in 2005, of which the main changes are in the 
area of personal bankruptcy.
46  Individual debtors must take a financial counseling course 
before filing for bankruptcy.  Also, they must pass a series of means tests in order to file 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.  If debtors’ household income is greater than the median 
level in their state and if their disposable income over a five year period exceeds either 
$10,000 or 25% of their unsecured debt, then they must file for bankruptcy under Chapter 
13 rather than Chapter 7.   In addition, the homestead exemption is limited to $125,000 
unless debtors have owned their homes for 3.3 years at the time they file for bankruptcy.   
  These changes are expected to reduce the number of personal bankruptcy filings by 
debtors who have relatively high earnings and they will also prevent millionaire debtors 
(O.J. Simpson is a recent example) from moving to high exemption states such as Texas 
and Florida to shelter their millions from creditors.   But the reform seems unlikely to 
substantially reduce the overall number of bankruptcy filings, since most debtors who file 
for personal bankruptcy are in the lower half of the household income distribution in their 
states.       
 
 II.   Trends in Personal Bankruptcy Filings   
 
       The number of personal (non-business) bankruptcy filings increased from 241,000 in 
1980 to more than 1.6 million in 2003—more than six-fold.  During the 6-year period 
from 1980 to 1985, a total of 1.8 million personal bankruptcy filings occurred; while 
during the 6-year period from 1998 to 2003, there were 8.6 million filings.  Since the 
same individual cannot file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 more often than once every 
six years, this means that the proportion of households that filed for bankruptcy rose from 
                                                 
46 The new law is the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.     
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2.2% in 1980-85 to 8.2% in 1998-2003.  One of the important issues in personal 
bankruptcy is to explain the large increase in the number of filings.        
      Because Chapter 7 is so favorable to debtors, 70% of personal bankruptcy filing occur 
under Chapter 7.  95% of debtors who file under Chapter 7 have no non-exempt assets 
and repay nothing to creditors.
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III.   Research on Personal Bankruptcy--Theory   
 
A.  Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Policy—Consumption Insurance and Work Effort  
In this section I discuss a model of optimal personal bankruptcy exemptions that takes 
account of both the tradeoff between loan availability and work incentives after 
bankruptcy and the objective of insuring debtors against very low consumption levels.
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However the model ignores conflicts of interest among creditors by assuming that each 
debtor has only a single creditor and it assumes that there are no alternate forms of 
consumption insurance, such as unemployment compensation, welfare, or income taxes.   
The model also assumes that there is only one personal bankruptcy procedure that 
combines Chapters 7 and 13.  Under it, debtors may be obliged to repay from both  
financial wealth and post-bankruptcy earnings.  This differs from current U.S. bankruptcy 
law, which allows debtors to choose between two bankruptcy procedures and exempts 
either financial wealth or future earnings completely.  In particular, the model examines 
whether and when the “fresh start” policy of exempting all post-bankruptcy wages is 
economically efficient.   The fresh start has traditionally been justified based on the 
argument that it causes debtors to work more after bankruptcy, since they keep all of their 
earnings rather than paying them to creditors.  But this argument has never been carefully 
analyzed.
49  
                                                 
47 See Executive Office for U.S. Trustees (2001) for data on payoff rates.  For bankruptcy filing data, see 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1988, table 837, and Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (for 
recent years). 
48 The objective of minimizing negative externalities that harm debtors’ family members, discussed above, 
is assumed to be part of the insurance objective.  This section draws on White (2005), Fan and White 
(2003), Wang and White (2000), and Adler, Polak, and Schwartz (2000).   Other theoretical papers on the 
economic effects of personal bankruptcy law include Domowitz and Alexopoulos (1998) and Athreya 
(2002) (exploring the macroeconomic effects of bankruptcy law).  
49 The U.S. Supreme Court provided this justification for the fresh start:  “from the viewpoint of the wage 
earner, there is little difference between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor.”  Local Loan 
Co. v. Hunt, 202 U.S. 234 (1934).     46 
       Suppose in period 1, a representative individual borrows a fixed amount B at interest 
rate r, to be repaid in period 2.  The interest rate is determined by lenders’ zero profit 
constraint.  The loan is assumed to be the individual’s only loan.  In period 2, wealth is 
uncertain.  The debtor first learns her period 2 wealth, then decides whether to file for 
bankruptcy, and, finally, chooses her period 2 labor supply.  Period 2 labor supply  
depends on whether the debtor files for bankruptcy.       
      There is a wealth exemption X in bankruptcy that combines states’ exemptions for 
home equity and other assets.  It can take any non-negative dollar value.  There is also an 
exemption for a fixed fraction m of post-bankruptcy earnings, where 0 < m £ 1.
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Bankruptcy costs are assumed to be a fixed dollar amount,  S.   In bankruptcy, the debt is 
discharged, but the debtor must use all her non-exempt wealth and earnings (up to the 
amount owed) to repay.           
       The representative individual’s utility function is assumed to depend positively on 
consumption and negatively on labor supply in each period.  Individuals are assumed to 
be risk averse.  Period 2 work hours are denoted  b N  in bankruptcy and  n N  outside of 
bankruptcy, where  b N  and  n N  are both variables.  When debtors file for bankruptcy, 
there is a negative substitution effect that causes their labor supply to fall, since debtors 
keep only the exempt fraction of their marginal earnings rather than 100% (assuming that 
m < 1).  Filing for bankruptcy also causes a wealth effect on labor supply.  If the 
substitution effect exceeds the wealth effect, then in the neighborhood of W ˆ ,  n b N N < .
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        Individual debtors decide whether to file for bankruptcy depending on which 
alternative maximizes their utility.  (Note that debtors do not default without filing for 
bankruptcy—see below for discussion of the default decision.)  Debtors file for 
bankruptcy in period 2 if their wealth turns out to be below a threshold level W ˆ  and 
repay in full otherwise.  Figure 1 shows debtors’ period 2 consumption as a function of 
their period 2 wealth.  Consumption is divided in three regions:  region 3 where  W W ˆ >  
                                                 
50 Note that even a wealth exemption of zero provides some insurance to debtors, since their wealth cannot 
become negative as a result of debt repayment.  The earnings exemption is assumed to be a fraction of 
earnings since the non-bankruptcy wage garnishment exemption takes this form.  The latter covers 75% of 
earnings as long as weekly earnings exceed 30 times the Federal minimum wage rate.  See Hynes (2002) 
for discussion of alternate ways of taxing debtors’ post-bankruptcy earnings.     
51  See the empirical section below for evidence on the labor supply response to bankruptcy.      47 
and the debtor avoids bankruptcy and repays in full; region 2 where  W W X ˆ £ £ , the 
debtor files for bankruptcy and repays part of her debt from both wealth and future 
earnings; and region 1 where  X W < , the debtor files for bankruptcy and repays only 
from future earnings.  There is a discontinuous jump in consumption at W ˆ that reflects 
the effect of the discontinuous change in labor supply from  b N  to  n N  at W ˆ .  Assuming 
that labor supply falls when debtors file for bankruptcy ( n b N N < ), consumption must 
rise in order for debtors to be indifferent between filing versus not filing.         
        While increasing either of the two exemptions in bankruptcy provides debtors with 
additional consumption insurance in period 2, there are important differences between 
them.  Raising the wealth exemption X transfers consumption from region 3 to region 2 
of figure 1, or from the highest to the middle consumption region.  Consumption 
increases in region 2 since more of debtors’ wealth is exempt; but it falls in region 3 since 
lenders raise interest rates.  However raising the earnings exemption m transfers 
consumption from region 3 to regions 1 and 2 of figure 1, or from the highest to the 
middle and lowest consumption regions.  Consumption increases in both regions 1 and 2 
since debtors keep a higher fraction of their earnings in bankruptcy.  This means that the 
consumption insurance provided by a higher earnings exemption is more valuable at the 
margin than that provided by a higher wealth exemption, since only a higher earnings 
exemption raises consumption in the region where it is most valuable.  This suggests a 
new justification for the “fresh start”--that it provides particularly valuable consumption 
insurance.     
       Assume that there are many representative individuals and they all apply to borrow 
in period 1.  Lenders’ zero profit condition determines the market-clearing interest rate, r.   
When either of the exemption levels change, the interest rate also changes.  At very high 
exemption levels, lenders may cease lending because no interest rate is high enough to 
satisfy the zero profit constraint.
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        Because all individuals are identical in period 1, the representative individual’s 
expected utility function is the same as the social welfare function.  The optimal wealth 
                                                 
52 See White (2005) and Longhofer (1997) for discussion.       48 
and earnings exemption levels are therefore determined by maximizing the social welfare 
function with respect to m and X, subject to lenders’ zero profit constraint.    
        The first order conditions determining the optimal wealth and earnings exemption 
levels have an intuitive explanation if debtors’ period 2 work effort is assumed be fixed 
rather than variable.  In this situation, higher values of either m or X benefit debtors by 
providing additional consumption insurance.  But debtors pay twice for the additional 
insurance:   first in the form of higher interest rates and, second, in the form of higher 
expected bankruptcy costs, since debtors file for bankruptcy and pay the bankruptcy costs 
of  S more often when exemption levels rise.  Because creditors are constrained to break 
even, the first cost represents the fair price for the additional consumption insurance.  But 
the second cost implies that debtors pay more than the fair price.  This means that if 
debtors were risk neutral, they would prefer to forego consumption insurance completely 
and the optimal wealth and earnings exemption levels would both be zero.  But if debtors 
are risk averse, then they prefer to buy some consumption insurance even though it costs 
more than the fair price.  In the risk aversion case, the optimal earnings and wealth 
exemption levels occur where the declining marginal utility of additional consumption 
insurance is just offset by the marginal cost of insurance.  As debtors become more risk 
averse, the optimal wealth and earnings exemptions rise.    
        Now consider how the optimal exemption levels are affected if debtors’ period 2 
labor supply varies in response to changes in the exemption levels.   Introducing variable 
labor supply in bankruptcy adds two additional terms to the first order condition for the 
optimal earnings exemption.  The first is the effect on debt repayment.  Within the 
bankruptcy region, labor supply  b N  now increases as m rises, so that debtors repay more 
in bankruptcy and creditors reduce interest rates.  As a result, the consumption insurance 
provided by a higher earnings exemption becomes cheaper, debtors wish to buy more, 
and the optimal earnings exemption rises.  The second of these terms involves the 
covariance of labor supply in bankruptcy with the marginal utility of consumption in 
bankruptcy.   Since this covariance is positive,
53 variable labor supply causes period 2 
                                                 
53 The covariance is positive because, within the bankruptcy region, higher wealth causes both labor supply 
and the marginal utility of consumption to fall.     49 
consumption to become riskier, which makes consumption insurance more valuable.  
Variable labor supply thus causes the optimal earnings exemption to increase.               
      Now consider how the optimal wealth exemption changes when period 2 labor supply 
is assumed to vary.  Only one additional term is added to the first order condition for the 
optimal wealth exemption.  Within the bankruptcy region, the larger exemption causes 
debtors’ wealth to rise and their labor supply to fall, so that the wealth effect on labor 
supply is negative.  Since there is no substitution effect on labor supply, the overall effect 
is that labor supply falls, debtors repay less in bankruptcy and creditors therefore raise 
interest rates.  This makes the consumption insurance provided by the wealth exemption 
more expensive, so that debtors wish to buy less, and the optimal wealth exemption falls.        
      These results suggest that the first order condition for the optimal earnings exemption 
is likely to have a corner solution and the first order condition for the optimal wealth 
exemption to have an interior solution.  Thus the optimal exemption policy is likely to be 
the “fresh start”—the 100% earnings exemption--combined with a less-than-unlimited 
wealth exemption.    
       Wang and White (2000) used simulation techniques to explore an extended version 
of the model in which there are two types of debtors—opportunists and non-opportunists.  
Non-opportunists behave as discussed above, but opportunists hide a fraction of their 
wealth when they file for bankruptcy.  Since hiding wealth increases the gain from filing 
for bankruptcy, opportunists file more often than non-opportunists.  (Opportunists do not 
hide any of their post-bankruptcy earnings in the model--perhaps because the bankruptcy 
trustee can check on debtors’ earnings but not their wealth.)  In Wang and White’s 
model, debtors choose whether to behave opportunistically based on an individual taste 
for cheating.  The more debtors behave opportunistically, the higher are interest rates and 
the worse off are non-opportunists.        
      Wang and White first show that when all individuals are non-opportunists, the 
optimal bankruptcy policy is always the fresh start combined with an intermediate wealth 
exemption.  But when individuals are allowed to choose whether to be opportunists or 
not, then it is sometimes efficient to abolish the fresh start and set the earnings exemption 
below 100%.   This is because the fresh start makes opportunistic behavior particularly 
attractive, since opportunists gain from hiding wealth in bankruptcy and also keep all of   50 
their post-bankruptcy earnings.  But when the fresh start is abolished, opportunists’ gain 
from hiding wealth comes at the cost of lower net earnings, since they pay the 
“bankruptcy tax” on earnings more often.   Thus abolishing the fresh start is particularly 
effective in discouraging opportunism. Wang and White also find that, when the optimal 
bankruptcy policy is to abolish the fresh start by setting the earnings exemption below 
100%, it is simultaneously efficient to raise the wealth exemption.  This is because, since 
the two exemptions are partial substitutes in providing consumption insurance, it is 
efficient to offset a reduction in one exemption with an increase in the other.
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        The theoretical model of bankruptcy yields several testable hypotheses.  Most 
involve hypotheses concerning how variable wealth exemption affect debtors’ and 
creditors’ behavior, since these predictions can be tested using the variation in wealth 
exemptions across U.S. states.   First, in jurisdictions that have higher wealth exemptions 
in bankruptcy, consumption is more fully insured and therefore is predicted to vary less.  
Second, in jurisdictions with higher wealth exemptions, interest rates are predicted to be 
higher and the supply of credit is predicted to be lower.  Third, if debtors are risk averse, 
then their demand for credit will be higher in jurisdictions with higher wealth 
exemptions, since they prefer to borrow more when the downside risk is lower.  Fourth, if 
potential entrepreneurs are risk averse, then jurisdictions with higher wealth exemptions 
are predicted to have more entrepreneurs.  This is because potential entrepreneurs are 
more willing to take the risk of going into business if a generous bankruptcy exemption 
reduces the cost of business failure.   
      I survey the empirical literature in section III below.   
 
     B.  Additional Theoretical Issues. 
       Now turn to other theoretical issues.   
1.  Default versus bankruptcy.   In the previous section, we assumed that debtors who 
default on repaying their debt always file for bankruptcy.  But in reality, debtors may  
default without filing for bankruptcy or default first and file for bankruptcy later.  When 
                                                 
54 Wang and White (2003) also found that as opportunists hide a larger fraction of their wealth when they 
file for bankruptcy, eventually the fresh start again becomes the optimal bankruptcy policy.           51 
debtors default but do not file for bankruptcy, creditors may garnish a fraction—usually 
25%--of debtors’ wages.  However, pursuing garnishment is a risky strategy for creditors, 
because debtors may turn out to be unemployed, may quit their jobs or be fired, or may 
file for bankruptcy in response to garnishment.      
White (1998b) used an asymmetric information model to examine whether, in 
equilibrium, debtors might default but not file for bankruptcy.  The model has two types 
of debtors, type A’s and type B’s.  Both types decide whether to default, and, following 
default, creditors decide whether to pursue garnishment.  The two types of debtors differ 
in how they respond to garnishment:  type A’s respond by repaying in full, while type B’s 
file for bankruptcy.  Creditors are assumed unable to identify individual debtors’ types 
when they default.  I show that, in equilibrium, all type B’s default, type A’s play mixed 
strategies (they either default or repay in full) and creditors play mixed strategies (they 
either pursue garnishment or not).  This means that in equilibrium, some debtors default 
and obtain the benefit of debt forgiveness without bearing the cost of filing for 
bankruptcy or losing wages to garnishment.  The model suggests that the U.S. personal 
bankruptcy system encourages some debtors to default even when they could repay their 
debts.   
    
 2.  Waiving the right to file for personal bankruptcy              
In the corporate bankruptcy context, several researchers have argued that debtors 
should be allowed to waive their right to file for bankruptcy or to contract with creditors 
about bankruptcy procedures (see Schwartz, 1997, and the discussion above).  But under 
current U.S. bankruptcy law, waivers are unenforceable and the rules of bankruptcy 
cannot be changed by contract.  In this section I discuss whether debtors should be 
allowed to waive their right to file for personal bankruptcy.
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55 See Rea (1984), Jackson (1986), and Adler, Polak and Schwartz (2000) for discussion of waivers in the 
personal bankruptcy context.  Jackson (1986) points out that not allowing waivers has the benefit of 
encouraging lenders to monitor to whom they lend.  Rea (1984) considers the possibility of debtors 
agreeing to bear some pain, such as the pain of a broken arm, if they default.  Adler et al (2000) point out 
that giving a creditor security is equivalent to issuing a waiver for a particular debt, so that waivers are 
permitted if they take this form.  Adler et al also discuss reaffirmations, which involve debtors in 
bankruptcy agreeing to forego discharge of particular debts.  These agreements are allowed because they 
occur after debtors file for bankruptcy.      52 
 What does it mean for individual debtors to waive their right to file for bankruptcy?  
Debtors who issue waivers cannot obtain a discharge of their debts by filing for 
bankruptcy.  However they can still default and, if so, they are protected by their states’ 
wealth exemptions, which also apply outside of bankruptcy, and by the Federal or state 
limits on wage garnishment, which restrict garnishment to 25% of debtors’ wages or less 
in a few states.  Individuals who borrow and waive their right to bankruptcy make a 
default decision that is similar to the bankruptcy decision analyzed above.  Applying the 
bankruptcy decision model discussed above to debtors’ decision to default, debtors 
determine a threshold level of wealth such that they are indifferent between defaulting 
versus repaying in full.  They default if wealth turns out to be less than this threshold.
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Would individual debtors ever choose to issue waivers?  Formally, this amounts to a 
choice by debtors between facing the bankruptcy decision described in section IIIA 
versus facing a default decision with no option of filing for bankruptcy.  Debtors would 
make this decision by comparing their ex ante expected utility in the two situations, with 
the expected utility expression for the bankruptcy decision evaluated at the relevant 
wealth and earnings exemptions in bankruptcy and for the default decision evaluated at 
the relevant garnishment exemptions and non-bankruptcy wealth exemptions in default.  
Interest rates would also differ in the two situations.  Suppose creditors are allowed to 
garnish 25% of debtors’ wages following default, while the fresh start prevails in 
bankruptcy.  Then debtors who issued waivers would face more risk in their period 2 
consumption, because their consumption in high wealth states would rise as a result of 
lower interest rates, but their consumption in low wealth states would fall because of 
wage garnishment following default.  Debtors who issued waivers would probably 
increase their work effort as a means of reducing risk.  This suggests that debtors who are 
risk averse would not issue waivers.  But now suppose there are both risk averse and risk 
neutral debtors, where the majority of debtors is risk averse and the minority is risk 
neutral.  Then if the fresh start and a high wealth exemption in bankruptcy were adopted 
                                                 
56 See Hynes (2004) for an argument that the system for protecting debtors outside of bankruptcy could 
substitute for the personal bankruptcy system.  The main difference between the bankruptcy versus non-
bankruptcy systems of protecting debtors is that debt is discharged only in bankruptcy.  Hynes argues that 
debt could be discharged outside of bankruptcy by adopting short statutes of limitations for debt collection.       53 
to accommodate the preferences of the risk averse majority, the risk neutral minority may 
prefer to issue waivers.   
However there are a number of externality arguments that support the current policy 
of prohibiting waivers.  One is that waivers may make individual debtors’ families worse 
off, since spouses and children bear most of the cost of reduced consumption if the debtor 
has a bad draw on wealth, but debtors may not take this into account in deciding whether 
to issue waivers.  Also, debtors may underestimate the probability of having a bad draw 
on wealth, so that they may issue waivers even when it is against their self-interest.  
Third, prohibiting waivers benefits the government itself, since its expenses for social 
safety net programs are lower when debtors can file for bankruptcy and avoid repaying 
their debts.  Fourth, allowing waivers might have adverse macroeconomic effects.  This is 
because debtors who issue waivers are more likely to repay than debtors who retain the 
right to file for bankruptcy.  As a result, debtors who issue waivers reduce their 
consumption more in response to a bad draw on wealth.  But if many debtors 
simultaneously reduce consumption, the economy could go into a recession.
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       Finally, there is an information asymmetry argument in favor of prohibiting waivers.  
Suppose there are two types of debtors who differ not because they are risk averse versus 
risk neutral, but because they have high versus low variance of period 2 wealth.  Also 
suppose creditors cannot observe individual debtors’ types.  If waivers are prohibited, 
then suppose a pooling equilibrium occurs in the credit market and all debtors borrow at 
an intermediate interest rate that reflects the average probability of default.  But if 
waivers were permitted, then low variance debtors might prefer to issue them as a means 
of signaling their type.  Lenders would then respond by lowering the interest rates they 
charge debtors who issue waivers (since they default less often) and raising the interest 
rates they charge debtors who do not issue waivers, i.e., the pooling equilibrium would be 
replaced by a separating equilibrium.  In this situation, allowing waivers would be 
                                                 
57 Olson (1999) argues that the Great Depression resulted from many debtors’ sharply reducing 
consumption in order to avoid defaulting on their debts (mainly car and furniture loans) after the stock 
market crash of 1929.  At that time, most consumer debt was secured by the goods that the loans were used 
to buy.   Debtors who defaulted lost the entire value of the collateral even if the remaining amount owed on 
the loan was small.           
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economically inefficient if the low variance debtors’ gain is less than the high variance 
debtors’ loss.
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3.   The option value of bankruptcy. 
      In the first section of this chapter, I discussed how the positions of corporate creditors 
and equityholders  can be expressed as options.  Similarly, the position of consumer 
debtors can be expressed as put options.  If debtors’ future wealth turns out to be high, 
then they repay their debts in full.  But if debtors’ future wealth turns out to be low, then 
they can exercise their option to “sell” the debt to creditors by filing for bankruptcy.  The 
price of exercising the put option is the amount that debtors are obliged to repay in 
bankruptcy, which equals the minimum of debtors’ non-exempt wealth or zero.      
      White (1998a) calculated the value of the option to file for bankruptcy for households 
in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID), a representative sample of U.S. 
households.   The PSID asks questions concerning respondents’ wealth at five-year 
intervals and, for many households in the panel, there are multiple observations on 
wealth.  This allows a household-specific variance of wealth and a household-specific 
value of  the option to file for bankruptcy to be calculated.  The results showed that the 
value of the option to file for bankruptcy is high for households in all portions of the 
wealth distribution.   The high value of the bankruptcy option suggests that one reason 
why the personal bankruptcy filing rate has risen over time is that, as of the early 1990’s, 
the value of the option to file for bankruptcy was positive for many more households than 
the number that had already filed.     
 
4.  Bankruptcy and incentives for strategic behavior  
 
      A problem with U.S. personal bankruptcy procedures is that they encourage debtors 
to engage in strategic behavior in order to increase their financial gain from filing for 
bankruptcy.   Under current U.S. law, debtors’ financial benefit from filing for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 can be expressed as:   
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Financial benefit = max{B(1+r) – max[W - X,0], 0} – S                      (1) 
 
Here B(1+r) is the amount of debt discharged in bankruptcy, max[W-X,0] is the value of 
non-exempt assets that debtors must give up in bankruptcy, and S indicates bankruptcy 
costs, including legal and filing fees, the cost of bankruptcy stigma, the cost of reduced 
access to credit following bankruptcy.  Eq. (1) assumes that the fresh start policy is in 
effect, so that all post-bankruptcy earnings are exempt from the obligation to repay.   
     White (1998a and 1998b) calculated the financial benefit of filing for bankruptcy for 
each household in a representative sample of U.S. households--the 1992 Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF).  (I assumed that bankruptcy costs, S, were zero.)   The results 
were that approximately one-sixth of U.S. households had positive financial benefit and 
would therefore benefit from filing.   I also examined how the results would change if 
debtors pursued various strategies to increase their financial gain from bankruptcy.  The 
strategies are:  (a) debtors converting assets from non-exempt to exempt by using non-
exempt assets to repay part or all of their mortgages, if the additional home equity would 
be exempt in bankruptcy, (b) debtors moving to more valuable houses, if doing so would 
allow them to shelter additional non-exempt wealth in bankruptcy, and (c) debtors 
charging all of their credit cards to the limit, but not obtaining new credit cards.  These 
strategies together increased the proportion of households that benefited from bankruptcy 
from one-six to one-third.  A final strategy involves debtors moving to Texas before 
filing, since Texas has an unlimited homestead exemption and also allows debtors to use 
the Federal bankruptcy exemptions, which are particularly favorable to renters.   
Combining all of these strategies implies that 61% of all U.S. households could benefit 
by filing for bankruptcy.   These results suggest that, even with high bankruptcy filing 
rates, many more households in the U.S. could benefit from filing for bankruptcy than 
have already filed.  They also suggest that the bankruptcy filing rate rose rapidly over the 
decade following 1992 because consumers learned that filing for bankruptcy was 
financially beneficial and many of them responded by doing so.           
      
6.  Bankruptcy and the social safety net.    56 
     Personal bankruptcy is not the only source of consumption-smoothing insurance.  
Government safety net programs, including food stamps, welfare, unemployment 
insurance, workers’ compensation, and the earned income credit, also insure 
consumption.  While bankruptcy provides consumption insurance by forgiving 
individuals’ debts when their wealth or earnings are low, safety net programs provide 
consumption insurance by giving additional cash or in-kind transfers to individuals 
whose wealth and earnings are low.    
     Jackson (1986) and Posner (1995) both pointed out that bankruptcy reduces the cost to 
the government of providing a social safety net.  This is because, when individuals’ debts 
are discharged in bankruptcy, their consumption levels rise and private lenders rather 
than the government bear the cost.  Note that cost reduction for the government may also 
be an explanation for why bankruptcy law does not allow debtors to waive their right to 
file for bankruptcy.
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IV.  Research on Personal and Small Business Bankruptcy—Empirical 
Work   
 
     Researchers interested in the empirical research on personal bankruptcy owe a vote of 
thanks to the U.S. Constitution and to Congress.  The U.S. Constitution reserved for the 
Federal government the power to adopt bankruptcy laws, which means that bankruptcy 
law is uniform all over the U.S.  But in 1978, Congress gave the states the right to set 
their own wealth exemption levels, so that this aspect of bankruptcy law alone varies 
among the states.  The states have also aided the research cause by adopting widely 
varying exemption levels and by making relatively few changes in their exemption levels 
since the early 1980’s.  This has allowed researchers to treat exemption levels starting in 
the early 1980’s as exogenous to whatever bankruptcy-related decision they are 
investigating.   
                                                 
59 Private lenders in turn shift the burden of bankruptcy onto non-defaulting debtors by raising interest 
rates.  Similarly, the costs of programs such as unemployment compensation and workers’ compensation 
are borne by workers who are not unemployed and not injured on the job, since these programs are 
financed by premiums paid by employers on behalf of all workers.           
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     In this section, I review research on the effect of bankruptcy exemptions on a variety 
of behaviors, including the decision to file for bankruptcy, the labor supply decision after 
bankruptcy, the decision to become an entrepreneur, and the availability of consumer and 
small business credit.   Before doing so, I briefly examine research on the political 
economy of personal bankruptcy.   
 
A.   Political Economy of Bankruptcy 
     In the 19
th century, some of the Western states competed for migrants by offering 
protection to debtors from their—presumably Eastern—creditors.  Texas particularly 
followed this strategy during its period of independence from 1839 to 1845, because it 
expected the Mexican leader Santa Ana to re-invade and needed immigrants who could 
help in its defense.  Texas therefore adopted the first property exemption, for homesteads.  
Texas’ pro-debtor laws attracted immigrants from nearby U.S. states and these states 
responded by adopting generous exemptions of their own in order to compete. While pro-
debtor laws presumably attract “deadbeats,” they are likely to be entrepreneurial and 
well-suited to the needs of a frontier economy.   Even today, most of the states that have 
unlimited homestead exemptions form a cluster near Texas.  They include, besides Texas, 
Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Iowa and South Dakota.  In addition, Florida has an 
unlimited homestead exemption and Minnesota had one from the early 1980’s until 1996.       
     Brinig and Buckley (1996) examined whether states still use bankruptcy policy to 
attract migrants, using data from the late 1980’s.  Rather than use exemption levels as 
their measure of bankruptcy policy, they used bankruptcy filing rates.  This means they 
assume that states with high bankruptcy filing rates have debtor-friendly policies and vice 
versa.  They found that states with higher bankruptcy filing rates had higher immigration 
rates than states with lower bankruptcy filing rates.  To some extent, these results seem 
surprising, since states with higher bankruptcy filing rates are likely to have scarce and 
expensive credit.  Brinig and Buckley’s results suggest that immigrants in general are 
more concerned about fleeing their old creditors than about obtaining credit to set up new 
businesses.  Brinig and Buckley did not test whether higher exemption levels attract more 
immigration.       58 
     Hynes, Malani and Posner (2003) examine the determinants of states’ bankruptcy 
exemption levels and test a variety of interest group explanations for exemption levels.  
The only variable that they found was significantly related to current exemption levels is 
states’ exemption levels in the 1920’s.  Thus whatever factors determine states’ 
exemption levels, they appear to be very persistent.
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B.  Studies of the Bankruptcy Filing Decision using Aggregate Data 
     The earliest empirical work on the bankruptcy filing decision used aggregate yearly 
data for the U.S. to show that the passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (the current U.S. 
bankruptcy law) caused the number of bankruptcy filings to increase.  See Shepard 
(1984), Boyes and Faith (1986), Peterson and Aoki (1984), and Domowitz and Eovaldi 
(1993).  A weakness of these studies is that they could only examine the overall effect of 
the new Code’s adoption on the bankruptcy filing rate.  Because the 1978 Code made 
many changes in bankruptcy law, these studies capture the overall impact of the changes 
on the bankruptcy filing rate, but cannot isolate which particular features of the Code 
caused the filing rate to rise.   Buckley (1994) used aggregate data for the U.S. and 
Canada to show that the bankruptcy filing rate in the U.S. is consistently higher.  He 
attributes this result to the fresh start policy in the U.S., which gives U.S. debtors a wider 
discharge from debt than Canadian debtors receive.  
       The theoretical model discussed above predicts that consumers are more likely to file 
for bankruptcy when their financial benefit is higher (see eq. (1) above).  Since financial 
benefit is positively related to the wealth exemption, this implies that filings will be 
higher in states with higher wealth exemptions.  Aggregate data at the national level does 
not allow this prediction to be tested, but aggregate data at the state or sub-state level 
does.  White (1987) used aggregate county-level data from the early 1980’s to test this 
relationship and found a positive and significant relationship between exemption levels 
and the bankruptcy filing rate.  Buckley and Brinig (1998) did the same type of study 
using aggregate data for a panel of states during the 1980’s, but did not find a significant 
relationship.  The Buckley-Brinig results for exemption levels are not surprising, since 
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they included state dummy variables in their model.  In their specification, the state 
dummies capture the effect of states’ initial exemption levels, while the exemption 
variables themselves capture only the effect of changes in exemptions.  The exemption 
variables were probably found to be insignificant because few states changed their 
exemptions during the period covered by the study.   
 
   
C.  Studies of the Bankruptcy Filing Decision using Household-Level Data 
          Efforts to estimate models of the bankruptcy filing decision using household-level 
data were initially hampered by the fact that none of the standard household surveys used 
by economists asked respondents whether they had ever filed for bankruptcy.  In an 
innovative study, Domowitz and Sartain (1997) used choice-based sampling to get 
around this limitation by combining two data sources:  a sample of households that filed 
for bankruptcy in the early 1980’s and a representative sample of U.S. households--the 
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)—that included information on households’ 
income and wealth.  They found that households were more likely to file for bankruptcy 
if they had greater medical and credit card debt and less likely to file if they owned a 
home.
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      In 1996, the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) ran a special survey that 
asked households whether they filed for bankruptcy during the previous decade and, if so, 
in what year.  Because the PSID is a panel dataset that surveys the same households 
every year and collects data on income and wealth, this data allowed a model of the 
bankruptcy filing decision to be estimated using a single dataset.     
      The economic model of bankruptcy discussed in the previous section implies that 
consumers are more likely to file for bankruptcy when their financial benefit from doing 
so is higher.  Specifically, eq. (1) predicts that only wealth, the bankruptcy exemption, 
the amount owed, and bankruptcy costs affect debtors’ filing decisions, since these are 
the only variables that affect the financial benefit from filing.  The economic model also 
predicts that income will not affect the bankruptcy decision, because it does not enter eq. 
(1).  An alternative, sociologically-oriented model of the bankruptcy filing decision was 
                                                 
61 Domowitz and Sartain also estimated a model of debtors’ choice between Chapters 7 versus 13.    60 
proposed by Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (1989).  It argues that debtors never plan 
for the possibility of bankruptcy nor act strategically to take advantage of it.  Instead, 
they file for bankruptcy only when an unanticipated event occurs that reduces their 
earnings or increases their expenses to the point where it is impossible for them to repay 
their debts.   In this view, the important factors affecting the bankruptcy decision are 
ability to repay, as measured by income, and whether adverse events have occurred that 
reduce ability to repay, such as job loss, illness or divorce.    
The PSID data allows the two models of the bankruptcy decision to be tested against 
each other, since the economic model predicts that wealth rather than income determines 
whether debtors file for bankruptcy, while the sociological model predicts that income is 
the most important determinant.  But in practice the test of the two models is somewhat 
imprecise.  This is because the PSID asks questions about respondents’ non-housing 
wealth only at five-year intervals.  As a result, wealth is unknown in most years and 
changes in wealth over time tend to be highly correlated with household income.      
      Fay, Hurst and White (FHW) (2002) used the PSID to test the two models of 
households’ bankruptcy decisions.  Their dataset consisted of PSID households in 1984 
to 1995, the years covered by the PSID’s 1996 bankruptcy survey.  The main explanatory 
variable was households’ financial benefit from filing in each year, calculated according 
to eq. (1).  Other explanatory variables included household income and whether the 
respondent was divorced or experienced other adverse events during the previous year.   
      FHW found that consumers are significantly more likely to file for bankruptcy when 
their financial benefit from filing is higher:  if financial benefit increased by $1,000 for 
all households, then the model predicts that the bankruptcy filing rate in the following 
year will rise by 7 percent.  Thus the empirical evidence supports the economic model of 
the bankruptcy filing decision.  But FHW also found that ability to repay affects the 
bankruptcy decision, since households with higher incomes are significantly less likely to 
file.  They also tested whether adverse events affect the bankruptcy decision and found 
that neither job loss nor illness of the household head or spouse in the previous year was 
significantly related to whether households filed for bankruptcy.  But a divorce in the 
previous year was found to be positively related to the probability of filing and the result 
was marginally statistically significant.  Thus the results support the economic model of   61 
bankruptcy.  The results concerning income also support the sociological model of 
bankruptcy, but they do not support the hypothesis that bankruptcy filings are triggered 
by adverse events.
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        FHW also investigated why bankruptcy filings have been rising over time.  An 
additional factor that affects households’ filing decision is the level of social disapproval 
of bankruptcy, or bankruptcy stigma.   Surveys of bankruptcy filers suggest that they 
usually learn about bankruptcy from friends, relatives, or co-workers, who tell them that 
the bankruptcy process is quick and easy.  This information both reduces debtors’ 
apprehension about filing and also passively sends the message that the level of 
bankruptcy stigma is low, since friends and relatives have filed and are willing to talk 
openly about their experiences.  FHW assumed that the level of bankruptcy stigma in a 
household’s region was inversely proxied by the aggregate bankruptcy filing rate in the 
region during the previous year, i.e., the higher the aggregate filing rate in the previous 
year, the lower the level of stigma.  They tested this variable in their bankruptcy filing 
model and found that, in regions with higher aggregate filing rates (lower bankruptcy 
stigma), the probability of households filing for bankruptcy was significantly higher.  
This suggests that as households in a region learn about bankruptcy, the filing rate rises.   
        Another recent study also examined the role of stigma in debtors’ bankruptcy 
decision.  Gross and Souleles (2002) used a dataset of credit card accounts from 1995 to 
1997 to estimate a model of individual debtors’ decisions to default and to file for 
bankruptcy.  Their explanatory variables included measures of each cardholder’s 
riskiness and the length of time since the account was opened.  Their measure of 
bankruptcy stigma was the residual.  They found that over the two year period from 1995 
to 1997, the probability that debtors filed for bankruptcy rose by 1 percentage point and 
the probability that debtors defaulted rose by 3 percentage points, holding everything else 
constant.  The authors interpret their results as evidence that the level of bankruptcy 
stigma fell during their time period.  
                                                 
62 Fisher (2004) re-estimated FHW’s model of the bankruptcy decision, adding as an additional ex planatory 
variable individuals’ income from government safety net programs.  He found that increases in both earned 
income and income from safety net programs reduce individuals’ probability of filing for bankruptcy—a 
result that supports the Jackson/Posner hypothesis that bankruptcy and government safety net programs are 
substitutes.    
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       Ausubel and Dawsey (2004) used credit card data to estimate a model of individual 
debtors’ decisions both to default—which they refer to as “informal bankruptcy”-- and to 
file for bankruptcy.  In their model, debtors first decide whether to default and then, 
conditional on default, they decide whether to file for bankruptcy.  Ausubel and Dawsey  
find that homestead exemptions mainly affect the decision to default; while garnishment 
restrictions mainly affect the decision to file for bankruptcy conditional on default.  These 
results are not surprising, since homestead and other exemptions apply regardless of 
whether debtors file for bankruptcy or not, while garnishment restrictions apply only in 
bankruptcy.  Ausubel and Dawsey argue that researchers have overlooked the importance 
of informal bankruptcy and the effect of garnishment restrictions on whether households 
file for bankruptcy, while overemphasizing the importance of exemptions.  But their 
empirical results provide additional support for the economic model of the 
bankruptcy/default decision.   
   
       
D.  Empirical Research on Work Effort and the “Fresh Start” 
     As discussed above, the Supreme Court justified the “fresh start” in bankruptcy (the 
100% exemption for post-bankruptcy earnings) on the grounds that debtors work more 
after filing for bankruptcy, because they keep all rather than part of their earnings after 
filing.  The Justices did not state precisely what model they had in mind.  One possibility 
is a model in which debtors have already defaulted and are subject to wage garnishment 
outside of bankruptcy.  Then because the fresh start applies in bankruptcy, filing allows 
debtors to keep all of their earnings at the margin, so that the substitution effect of filing 
leads to an increase in labor supply.  However in this model, filing for bankruptcy also 
increases debtors’ wealth effect by discharging their debt, so that there is an offsetting 
negative wealth effect on labor supply.  Thus the predicted effect of filing for bankruptcy 
on labor supply is actually ambiguous rather than positive.  Alternately, suppose debtors 
have not defaulted but are considering whether to simultaneously default and file for 
bankruptcy (the model discussed in section IIIA).  Also suppose the fresh start applies in 
bankruptcy.  Then there is no substitution effect of filing for bankruptcy because debtors 
keep all of their earnings at the margin regardless of whether they file or not.  But filing   63 
has a positive effect on debtors’ wealth that leads to a reduction in their labor supply.  
Thus the predicted effect of filing for bankruptcy on labor supply depends on the 
specifics of the model and could be either ambiguous or negative, rather than positive.      
Han and Li (2004) used the special bankruptcy survey and other data from the PSID 
to test whether debtors’ labor supply increases when they file for bankruptcy.  Their 
results are only marginally significant, but they found that filing for bankruptcy is not 
associated with an increase in labor supply—in other words labor supply either falls or 
remains constant when debtors file.  Han and Li’s results suggest that the traditional 
justification for the fresh start does not hold.   
 
E.   Bankruptcy and the Decision to Become an Entrepreneur 
     The U.S. personal bankruptcy system functions as a bankruptcy system for 
entrepreneurs well as for individuals generally.  About one in five personal bankruptcy 
filings in the U.S. list some business debt, suggesting the importance of bankruptcy to 
small business owners (Sullivan et al, 1989). 
          Starting or owning an unincorporated business involves incurring business debts 
for which the firm’s owners are personally liable.  This means that the variance of  
entrepreneurs’ wealth is high, because it includes the risk associated with their businesses 
failing or succeeding.  The personal bankruptcy system provides partial insurance for this 
risk since, if their businesses fail, entrepreneurs can file for personal bankruptcy under 
Chapter 7 and both their business and personal debts will be discharged.  As a result, 
personal bankruptcy law makes it more attractive for risk-averse individuals to become 
entrepreneurs  by partially insuring their consumption.  Further, states that have higher 
exemption levels provide more insurance because they allow entrepreneurs to keep 
additional financial assets--perhaps including their homes--when their businesses fail.  
This means that risk-averse individuals are predicted to be more likely to own or start 
businesses if they live in states with higher exemption levels.   
     Fan and White (2003) examined whether households that live in states with higher 
exemptions are more likely to start or own businesses, using household panel data from 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation.  They focused on the effect of the 
homestead exemption, since it is the largest and most variable of the bankruptcy   64 
exemptions.  They estimated separate models of whether homeowners versus renters own 
businesses, since only homeowners can use the homestead exemption.  They found that 
homeowners are 35% more likely to own businesses if they live in states with high or 
unlimited homestead exemptions rather than in states with low homestead exemptions, 
and the difference was statistically significant.  They also found a similarly large and 
significant effect for renters, which suggests that most renters who own businesses expect 
to become homeowners.  Fan and White also found that homeowners are 28% more 
likely to start businesses if they live in states with unlimited rather than low homestead 
exemptions, although the relationship was only marginally statistically significant.   
 
F. Bankruptcy and Credit Markets   
     The model discussed above suggests that bankruptcy exemptions affect the supply and 
demand for credit.  Creditors are predicted to respond to an increase in wealth exemption 
level by raising interest rates, reducing the supply of credit, and tightening credit 
rationing.  But individual debtors—assuming they are risk averse--respond to an increase 
in the exemption level by demanding more credit, because the additional consumption 
insurance reduces the risk of borrowing.  Debtors raise their credit demand because they 
benefit from having additional consumption insurance even though borrowing becomes 
more costly.  (However the increase in demand may be reversed at high exemption levels, 
since even risk averse debtors have declining marginal utility from additional insurance.)    
1.  General credit.  Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) were the first to examine the 
effect of variable wealth exemptions on consumer credit.  They used household data from 
the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which gives detailed information on debts 
and assets for a representative sample of U.S. households and also asks respondents 
whether they have been turned down for credit.  The GSW study did not distinguish 
between different types of credit or different types of exemptions, so that their credit 
variable was the sum of all types of loans and their exemption variable was the sum of 
each state’s homestead and personal property exemptions.   
     GSW found that households were 5.5 percentage points more likely to be turned down 
for credit if they lived in a state with exemptions in the highest rather than the lowest 
quartile of the exemption distribution. They also found that interest rates were higher in   65 
states with higher bankruptcy exemptions, but the effect depended strongly on borrowers’ 
wealth.  In particular, households in the second-to-lowest quartile of the wealth 
distribution paid interest rates that were 2.3 percentage points higher if they lived in high 
rather than low exemption states, but households in the third and highest quartiles of the 
wealth distribution paid the same interest rates regardless of the exemption level.     
    The authors also examined how the amount of debt held by households varies between 
high versus low exemption states.  Although supply and demand for credit cannot be 
separately identified, a finding that households hold more debt in high-exemption than 
low-exemption states suggests that the increase in demand for credit more than offsets the 
reduction in the supply of credit, and conversely.  The authors found that in high 
exemption states, high-asset households held more debt and low-asset households held 
less.   Thus when high-asset households increase their credit demand in response to 
higher exemption levels, lenders accommodate them by lending more.  But when low-
asset households increase their credit demand, lenders respond with tighter credit 
rationing.  GSW calculated that, holding everything else constant, a household whose 
assets placed it in the highest quartile of the asset distribution would hold $36,000 more 
debt if it resided in a state with combined bankruptcy exemptions of $50,000 rather than 
$6,000; while a household whose assets placed it in the second-to-lowest quartile of the 
distribution would hold $18,000 less debt.  Thus higher exemption levels were associated 
with a large redistribution of credit from low-asset to high-asset households.   
     The results of the study suggest that, while policy-makers often think that high 
bankruptcy exemptions help the poor, in fact they cause lenders to redistribute credit 
from low-asset to high-asset households and raise the interest rates they charge low-asset 
households.  
2.  Secured versus Unsecured Credit.  More recent studies of the effect of bankruptcy 
on credit markets distinguish between secured versus unsecured loans and between 
different types of exemptions.  Secured credit differs from unsecured credit in that, if the 
debtor defaults, the lender has the right to foreclose on/repossess a particular asset such 
as the debtor’s house or car.  The proceeds of selling the house/car go first to repay the 
secured debt and then the debtor receives up to the amount of the homestead exemption 
or the exemption for equity in cars, whichever is relevant.  Because the secured creditor   66 
must be repaid in full before the debtor benefits from the exemption, the terms of secured 
loans--unlike unsecured loans—are predicted to be unrelated to wealth exemptions.   
         However in practice, several factors muddy this prediction.  First, when debtors  
default on secured loans, they often file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in order to  
delay foreclosure or to reduce the principle amount of the loan (for auto loans).  Thus 
bankruptcy filings by debtors increase creditors’ collection costs.  Since filing for 
bankruptcy is more attractive in high-exemption states, secured lending is less attractive 
in these states.   Second, secured loans are often partly unsecured, because the market 
value of the collateral is less than the amount owed.  When sale of the collateral brings in 
too little to repay the debt in full, the secured lender has an unsecured claim for the 
unpaid portion of the loan and the value of this claim is negatively related to  exemption 
levels.  These factors suggest that the market for secured loans may also be affected by 
exemption levels.  
       Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) examined whether higher exemptions were related to 
individuals’ probability of being turned down for mortgages, using the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act data.  They found that the probability of being turned down for a 
mortgage was unrelated to exemption levels.   Lin and White (2001) examined the effect 
of higher exemptions on individuals’ probability of being turned down for both mortgage 
and home improvement loans.  Home improvement loans make a useful comparison to 
mortgages, since they are often unsecured or partially secured.  Individuals’ probability 
of being turned down for home improvement loans is therefore  predicted to be more 
strongly related to exemption levels than their probability of being turned down for 
mortgage loans.  Lin and White’s study used state dummies to control for differences in 
exemption levels across states in the initial year and year dummies to control for time 
trends, so that their exemption variables capture only the effect of changes in exemption 
levels.  They found that applicants for both mortgage and home improvement loans were 
more likely to be turned down in states with higher homestead exemptions.  But the effect 
of exemptions on debtors’ probability of being turned down for home improvement loans 
was both larger and more statistically significant than their probability of being turned 
down for mortgages.  Finally a recent paper by Chomsisengphet and Elul (2005) argues 
that exemptions have been found to be a significant determinant of whether applicants   67 
were turned down for mortgages only because previous researchers did not control 
adequately for individual applicants’ credit quality, which they argue is correlated with 
exemption levels.  But this argument is difficult to evaluate since the HMDA data 
includes only very limited information about individual applicants.  Overall, the question 
of whether exemption levels affect markets for secured credit remains unresolved.    
            3.    Small Business Credit.   Since debts of non-corporate businesses are personal 
liabilities of business owners, the terms of these loans are predicted to be affected by the 
exemption levels in the debtor’s state of residence.  In contrast, debts of incorporated 
businesses are not liabilities of their owners, so that the terms of loans to small 
corporations are predicted to be unrelated to exemption levels.  But in practice, this 
distinction is not so clear.  Creditors who lend to small corporations often require that the 
owners of the corporation personally guarantee the loan or give lenders second mortgages 
on their homes.  This abolishes the corporate/non-corporate distinction for the particular 
loan and suggests that personal bankruptcy law applies to small corporate credit markets 
as well.   
         The model discussed above suggests that, in states with high rather than low 
exemptions, demand for small business credit will be higher and supply of small business 
credit will be lower.  Although it is impossible to separately identify the effects of  
exemptions on credit supply versus demand, a finding that the amount of credit held by 
small businesses is lower in high exemption states would suggest that the reduction in 
supply more than offsets the increase in demand.  Berkowitz and White (2003) used data 
from the National Survey of Small Business Finance to examine how variations in 
exemption levels affect whether small business owners are turned down for credit and the 
size and interest rates on loans they receive.  They found that for non-corporate and 
corporate small businesses,  the probabilities of being turned down for credit rise by 32% 
and 30%, respectively, if firms are located in states with unlimited rather than low 
homestead exemptions.  Both relationships are statistically significant.  Conditional on 
receiving a loan, non-corporate businesses paid interest rates that were 2 percentage 
points higher and corporate firms paid interest rates that were 0.83 percentage points 
higher if they were located in states with high rather than low low homestead exemptions.    68 
Both types of firms also received less credit if they were located in states with high rather 
than low exemptions. 
 
      
G.  Macroeconomic  Effects of Bankruptcy  
 
    1.  Bankruptcy and consumption insurance.     The model discussed above 
emphasized the insurance role of bankruptcy and the fact that higher exemption levels 
provide additional consumption insurance.  The model predicts that the variance of 
household consumption in a state-year will be smaller if the state has a higher exemption 
level.  Grant (2003) tested this hypothesis using data from the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey, a panel survey of U.S. households.   For each state-year in his sample, he 
computed the average variance of household consumption.  Then he regressed the change 
in the average variance of consumption on the state’s exemption level, control variables, 
and state fixed effects.  Because the data cover a 20 year period, there are a large number 
of changes in exemption levels.   Grant found that higher exemption levels are associated 
with lower variance of consumption, i.e., additional consumption insurance.   
  
     2. Bankruptcy and portfolio reallocation.   Because unsecured debts are discharged 
when individual debtors file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 but some assets are exempt, 
debtors who contemplate filing for bankruptcy have an incentive to borrow—even at high 
interest rates—in order to acquire assets that are exempt in bankruptcy.  This behavior is 
referred to as “borrowing to save.”  The higher the bankruptcy exemption level in the 
debtor’s state, the stronger is debtors’ incentive to borrow to save.  (Similar types of 
strategic behavior were discussed above in connection with the proportion of households 
that would benefit from filing for bankruptcy.)    
   Lehnert and Maki (2002) examined whether households are more likely to borrow 
to save if they live in states with higher bankruptcy exemptions.  Their definition of 
borrowing to save is that a household simultaneously holds unsecured debt that would be 
discharged in bankruptcy and liquid assets that exceed 3% of gross income.  The authors 
tested their model using household-level panel data from the Consumer Expenditure   69 
Survey.  They found that homeowners were 1 to 4 percent more likely to borrow to save 
if they lived in states with bankruptcy exemptions that were above the lowest quartile of 
the exemption distribution.  The same relationship was not statistically significant for 
renters, which is not surprising since exemptions for renters are smaller and less variable.       
 
         Overall, the results of the empirical studies suggest that bankruptcy has important 
and wide-ranging effects on individual behavior.  Generous bankruptcy exemptions 
increase demand for credit by reducing the downside risk of borrowing, but reduce the 
supply of credit by increasing the probability of default.  In states with higher bankruptcy 
exemptions, individuals are turned down for credit more often and pay higher interest 
rates.  In these states, high asset-households hold more credit, while low asset- 
households hold less credit—suggesting that high exemptions redistribute credit from 
low-asset to high-asset households.  Small businesses are also affected by personal 
bankruptcy law.  They are more likely to be turned down for credit, pay higher interest 
rates, and borrow less if they are located in high exemption states.   In addition to their 
effects on credit markets, high bankruptcy exemptions also cause individual debtors to 
file for bankruptcy more often, become entrepreneurs more often, and reallocate their 
portfolios toward unsecured debt and liquid assets.  Contrary to the presumption of the 
“fresh start,” evidence suggests that individual debtors do not change their work hours 
significantly when they file for bankruptcy.  But higher bankruptcy exemptions benefit 
risk-averse individuals by reducing risk, since they provide partial consumption 
insurance.   
     The empirical work on bankruptcy suggests that the increase in the number of 
personal bankruptcy filings that occurred over the past 20 years could have been due to a 
combination of households gradually learning how favorable Chapter 7 is and bankruptcy 
becoming less stigmatized as filing became more common.  Whether the bankruptcy 
reforms adopted by Congress in 2005 will cause the number of filings to drop remains a 
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